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Independent Orbiter Assessment 
Assessment of the Active Thermal Control System FMEA/CIL 
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in 
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of 
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items 
List (CIL). 
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the 
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 222 06. Instructions 
for Prer, aration of FMEA and CIL. P CN-2. 6 A m i 1  1987. 
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Active Thermal 
Control System (ATCS) hardware, generating draft failure modes 
and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this 
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results 
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. 
Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE 
The IOA results were then compared to the available NASA FMEA/CIL 
data which consisted of a summary listing of ATCS EPD&C FMEA/CILs 
dated 1 October 1987, a summary listing of ATCS mechanical 
FMEA/CILs dated 1 October 1987, and the ATCS waiverable 
mechanical CILs presented to the Level 1/11 Review Board and 
contained in the document numbered SSV88-12. Discrepancies from 
the comparison were documented, and where enough information was 
available, recommendations for resolution of the discrepancies 
were made. This report documents the results of that comparison 
for the Orbiter ATCS hardware. 
The IOA product for the ATCS independent analysis consisted of 
310 failure mode l@worksheetsll that resulted in 101 Potential 
Critical Items (PCI) being identified. A comparison was made to 
the available NASA data identified above which consisted of 252 
FMEAs and 109 CIL items. The difference in the number of IOA 
analysis worksheets and NASA FMEAs can be explained by the 
different levels of analysis detail performed to identify failure 
modes. The comparison determined if there were any results found 
by the IOA which were not included in the NASA baseline, and, if 
there were any areas in which IOA recommended a criticality 
different than the one recommended by NASA. 
are covered in the following sections of this report. Due to 
budget re-evaluations, the IOA project was terminated before the 
discrepancies could be discussed with the NASA subsystem manager. 
Therefore, it should be kept in mind when reviewing this report 
that the discrepancies exist from the IOA point of view with no 
input from the NASA subsystem manager. 
Figure 1 presents a comparison of the available NASA data and the 
IOA recommended criticalities. In many cases, one NASA FMEA was 
matched to multiple IOA worksheets. Again due to budget and time 
constraints, no attempt was made to consolidate these multiple 
worksheets into a single FMEA. 
of IOA FMEA worksheets than NASA FMEAs. It should also be noted 
The discrepancies 
This results in a larger number 
1 
that the number of issues relates to the number of IOA worksheets 
with different criticalities. The number of C I L  issues reflects 
the number of items which should or should not be on the C I L .  If 
IOA and NASA criticalities are different, but both will appear on 
the C I L ,  the discrepancy will add to the overall issue count, but 
not to the C I L  issue count. 
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Figure 1 - ATCS FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW 
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2 . 0  INTRODUCTION 
2.1 Purpose 
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress 
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the 
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). 
undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space 
Shuttle design. 
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and 
technical accuracy. 
The NSTS Office has 
The MDAC is providing an independent assessment 
2.2 Scope 
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity 
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware 
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment 
Contractor Statement of Work. 
-hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and 
operational requirements for all mission phases. 
Each subsystem analysis addresses 
2.3 Analysis Approach 
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis 
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem 
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item 
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These 
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report, 
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime 
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in 
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the 
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is 
documented in this report. 
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization 
1.1 Define subsystem functions 
1.2 Define subsystem components 
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and 
assumptions 
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram 
2.1 Define subsystem 
2.2 Define major assemblies 
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations 
Step 3.0 Failure events definition 
3-1 Construct matrix of failure modes 
3.2 Document IOA analysis results 
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA F'MEA/CIL 
4.1 Resolve differences 
4.2 Review in-house 
4.3 Document assessment issues 
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager 
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions 
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in 
Appendix B. 
provide necessary additions and clarifications to the ground 
rules and assumptions contained i n  NSTS 22206. 
The subsystem specific ground rules were defined to 
5 
3 . 0  SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
3.1 Design and Function 
The Active Thermal Control Subsystem (ATCS) is made up of four 
major systems consisting of the Freon Coolant Loop (FCL), 
Radiator and Flow Control Assembly (RFCA), Flash Evaporator 
System (FES), and Ammonia Boiler System (ABS). The ATCS is 
shown schematically in Figure 2. 
Freon Coolant Loo~s 
The Orbiter ATCS continuously circulates Freon 21 through two 
independent Freon Coolant Loops (FCL). Each loop consists of two 
redundant pumps, one accumulator, flow control valves, and several 
heat exchangers. 
The FCL transfers heat from many orbiter systems while dumping 
the excess to either Ground Support Equipment (GSE) or the 
environment, depending upon mission phase. The main components 
that require cooling by the FCL are the three fuel cell stacks, 
equipment mounted to midbody coldplates, payload water coolant 
loop, and aft avionics/rate gyro assembly coldplates. 
Furthermore, the FCL is designed to provide heat to the hydraulic 
fluid and cabin oxygen. 
During the prelaunch phase, heat is transferred from the FCL 
through the GSE heat exchanger. After lift-off, the General 
Purpose Computer (GPC) sends a command to initiate cooling of the 
FCL by the FES which continues until the payload bay doors are 
opened on-orbit. While the shuttle is on-orbit, heat removal 
from the FCLs is performed primarily by the radiators. The FES 
is available, however, to supplement the radiators as required. 
Prior to de-orbit prep, the radiators are cold soaked. This 
cold-soaking allows the radiators to act as heat sinks when the 
payload bay doors are closed during entry. The primary heat 
extraction mechanism during entry is the FES, however. 
Additionally, the ABS will act as a supplement to the cold-soaked 
radiators when it is activated and the FES deactivated by GPC 
command at an altitude of 120K ft. 
Radiator and Flow Control Assembly 
The radiator is used as the primary method of rejecting heat from 
the Orbiter while on-orbit and as the secondary method during 
ascent and entry. Eight panels make up the radiator, four on 
each payload bay door. To increase heat rejection, the two 
forward panels on each door can be deployed. 
forward panels are capable of radiating heat from both sides. 
The basic heat .rejection capability from the panels is 61,000 
BTU/hr, but is dependent on the Orbiter attitude. 
Once deployed, the 
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The Flow Control Assembly (FCA) is located downstream of the 
radiator panels. The main components of the FCA are the bypass 
valve, flow control valve, mode control valve and several 
controllers. The main purpose of the FCA is to control flow by 
either bypassing the radiator panels completely, as during a cold 
soak, or, by allowing only a certain percentage of warm freon to 
bypass the panels. 
Flash EvaDorator Svsteq 
There are two flash evaporators: a high load evaporator which is 
sized to reject 95,000 BTU/hr; and a topping evaporator, sized to 
reject 35,500 BTU/hr. Both evaporators are used to reject these 
heat loads from the freon coolant loops during ascent at 
altitudes above 140,000 and during entry at altitudes above 
120,000 ft. Additionally, the topping evaporator can be used to 
supplement the radiators during on-orbit operations. 
The basic concept behind the operation of the flash evaporators 
is to flash water at its triple point pressure. To facilitate 
this flashing, the evaporators are cylindrical with a finned 
inner core. The hot Freon 21 from the FCLs flows around the 
finned core and water is sprayed onto the core from the nozzles 
in each evaporator. The water is vaporized and this process 
removes approximately 1,000 BTU per pound of water. In addition 
to the finned core, Freon 21 also flows through an anti-carryover 
device (ACOD) inside the evaporator to reduce the amount of water 
droplets in the exit ducts. 
The water used for the flash evaporator operation comes from the 
supply water subsystem via two feedlines. 
maintain the desired temperature in both feedlines. An 
accumulator in each feedline maintains the required operating 
pressure. 
evaporators so that each evaporator has an inlet valve/nozzle 
combination from each feedline. This yields redundant water 
supply paths for each evaporator. 
A series of heaters 
Each feedline separates in the vicinity of the 
Following vaporization in the flash evaporators, the water vapor 
is vented overboard via heated exit ducts terminating in heated 
nozzles. The topping evaporator has dual exit ducts terminating 
in sonic nozzles and is configured to provide non-propulsive 
venting. 
gives a propulsive venting effect when used. There are concerns 
about the use of the high load evaporator when the vernier jets 
are being used to control the vehicle. For these reasons, and 
also to prevent possible payload contamination from the high load 
evaporator venting, the high load evaporator is not used while 
on-orbit. 
The high load evaporator has only one exit duct and 
The flash evaporator operation is controlled by three controllers 
(primary A, primary B, and secondary). The primary controllers 
operate in conjunction with a given feedline (A or B) and are 
capable of controlling both the topping and high load evaporators 
simultaneously. When using the secondary controller with the 
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high load evaporator, it is necessary to select either the A or 
the B feedline. The secondary controller will use both feedlines 
simultaneously when controlling the topping evaporator. 
The controllers operate by opening the evaporator valve/nozzle at 
a frequency determined by the temperature of the Freon 21 loop at 
the appropriate evaporator exit. 
set this pulsing at a frequency so that the topping evaporator is 
activated at an FCL exit temperature of 62 degrees F; and is 
inhibited when the exit temperature reaches a lower limit of 43 
degrees F. Included in the primary controller circuitry is over- 
and under-temperature shutdown logic to protect the evaporators. 
The primary.controllers will 
Ammonia Boiler Svstem 
The Ammonia Boiler System (ABS) is capable of cooling the freon 
coolant loop below 120,000 feet and until the GSE is connected by 
evaporating liquid anhydrous ammonia. The system configuration 
consists of two independent redundant paths to supply ammonia to 
the boiler. The main components of the ABS are the shell and 
tube heat exchanger, two controllers, six control valves, and 
two storage tanks. Ammonia tank control valves are operated by 
the controllers to deplete one tank before switching to the 
alternate tank. Since one tank will typically provide all the 
required cooling, the order of tank usage is switched from flight 
to flight. However, due to current entry configuration of the 
radiators/FES, operation the ABS is not required and is 
maintained as a contingency backup. 
9 
3.2 Interfaces and Locations 
The location of the ATCS components on the Orbiter are shown in 
Figure 3. 
The ATCS interfaces with the Air Revitalization System (ARS)  at 
the H2O/Freon interchanger. At the interchanger, heat collected 
by the ARS is transferred to freon. 
to Ground Support Equipment (GSE) or into space via the 
radiators. The Electrical Power System (EPS) and pressurization 
systems also have heat removed by the ATCS. 
is warmed at the hydraulic heat exchanger by hot freon. 
The Active Thermal Control System interfaces with the Electrical 
Power Distribution & Control (EPD&C) system, the Display and 
Control (D&C) system, the instrumentation system, and GPC 
software, 
control assemblies for motors and valves. The D&C system 
provides the capability for the crew to monitor, configure or 
manually control the systems where necessary. 
instrumentation system processes the performance parameters 
required for system monitoring and control, The GPC software 
provides automatic control. 
The heat is then transferred 
The hydraulic system 
The EPDLC system provides the electric power and the 
The 
3.3 Hierarchy 
Figure 4 illustrates the hierarchy of the ATCS hardware and 
the corresponding subcomponents. Figures 5 through 22 comprise 
the detailed system representations. 
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4 .0  ASSESSMENT RESULTS 1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
The IOA analysis of the ATCS hardware initially generated 310 
failure mode worksheets and identified 101 Potential Critical 
Items (PCIs) prior to starting the assessment process. In order 
to facilitate comparison, seventy-four additional failure mode 
worksheets were generated. Additionally, upon closer 
examination, IOA deemed ten of the original failure modes to be 
non-credible and recommends deleting them. The analysis results 
were compared to the available NASA FMEA/CIL data consisting of a 
summary listing of ATCS EPD&C FMEA/CILs dated 1 October 1987, a 
summary listing of ATCS mechanical FMEA/CILs dated 1 October 
1987, and SSV88-12 containing the ATCS waiverable mechanical 
CILs. The discrepancy between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs 
can be explained by the different approaches used by NASA and IOA 
to group failure modes. This resulted in multiple IOA FMEAs 
being mapped to a single NASA FMEA. 
mapped to at least one IOA worksheet. 
However, every NASA FMEA is 
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the 
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented 
in Table I. 
It should be noted that the number of issues corresponds to the 
number of I O A  F'MEAs with criticalities different than their NASA 
counterparts. In the cases where multiple IOA FMEAs were matched 
to one NASA FMEA, a criticality mismatch would give rise to 
multiple issues. 
I 
1 
31 
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the 
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented 
in Table 11. 
11 
40 
10 
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each 
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the 
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix 
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous 
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System 
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No. 
1.0-WP-VA87001-005, Analysis of the ATCS, 01 December 1987. 
Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA F'MEA and 
corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations are also 
summarized. 
1 
3 
Table I11 presents a summary of the IOA failure criticalities for 
the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further discussion of each of these 
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in 
subsequent paragraphs. 
Criticality: 
FCL 
RFCA 
FES 
ABS 
1 
4 
8 
2/1R 
57 
14 
17 
13 
3 
7 
4 
3/1R 
17 
17 
68 
9 
3/2R 
3 
2 
27 
3/3 I ? 
37 I 1  
TOTAL 
119 
52 
163 
40 
In some cases, insufficient data was available to resolve a 
recommended criticality. For this case, no critiality was 
assigned and the item remained unresolved, indicated in the tc?O 
column. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
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Of the failure modes analyzed, one-hundred forty-seven (147) were 
determined to be potential critical items. 
potential critical items is presented in Table IV. 
A summary of the IOA 
-I 
4 
I 
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4.1 Freon Coolant Loop Assessment Results 
The assessment of the freon coolant loop failure modes resulted 
in 119 IOA FMEA worksheets being mapped to 87 NASA FMEAs. The 
119 IOA worksheets came from the 108 worksheets developed during 
the original analysis phase, 15 new IOA worksheets generated 
during the assessment phase, four of the original IOA worksheets 
deleted after re-examination, and nine original IOA worksheets 
being left unmapped. 
on the 119 IOA worksheets. Twenty-two of the issues are IOA 
FMEAs with criticalities different than their NASA counterparts: 
the remaining nine are the unmapped IOA FMEAs. 
there were 10 potential CIL issues. 
The twenty-two discrepant items can be grouped into two major 
categories. First, there are a number of failures which result 
only in the loss of sensor data. IOA recommends these failures 
be given a 3/3 criticality. NASA criticalities are frequently 
higher. However, since sensor data is not critical to mission 
completion or to crew/vehicle safety, IOA recommends the lower 
criticality. 
The assessment also yielded 31 issues based 
Of the 31 issues, 
The second major category for discrepancies involves failures 
which occur only during ground operations and which may result in 
launch delays or loss of ground cooling. By NSTS 22206, failures 
of this type are automatically assigned 3/3 criticalities. IOA 
recommends following these guidelines and assigning the FMEAs 3/3 
criticalities. 
In addition to the twenty-two discrepancies, there are nine 
unmapped IOA FMEAs. Eight of the unmapped FMEAs involve 
restricted flow or leakage of heat exchanger fluid. 
possible that these failures are covered in other NASA documents 
such as those corresponding to the appropriate heat exchanger 
(GSE, payload, hydraulics, etc.). However, this should be 
investigated and verified, particularly for the five of these 
FMEAs that have 2/1R criticalities and are thus PCIs. 
It is 
The final unmapped IOA worksheet is a failed off C&W light which 
may be covered under the NASA C&W FMEA baseline and which has a 
3/3 criticality. This low criticality rating puts the FMEA at a 
very low priority for re-examination by NASA. 
Tables V and VI present summaries of the FCL assessment results. 
Following Table V is an explanation of the table format which is 
used in the remainer of this report. 
I 
I 
i 
1 
I 3 4  
? 
- 
1 
- 
1 
TOTAL 
a7 
aa 
loa 
119 
IOA (2) 
Recommendations 
for NASA FMEAs 
1 
I Table V SUMMARY OF FCL FAILURE CRITICALITIES I 
3/ 1R 
37 9 14 11 I 14 
i41 3 12 
55 17 I 35 1Recommended 3 I 37 57 17 3 
This criticality breakdown is based on the NASA data used by IOA 
for the assessment. 
The IvIOA Recommendations for NASA FMF.AsRR is based on the 
criticality data provided by NASA but modified to reflect the 
changes being recommended by IOA. 
that a NASA FMEA should be divided to more accurately reflect 
individual criticalities, the NASA FMEA will be counted once for 
each recommended criticality. This will result in a higher total 
for the "IOA Recommendations for NASA FMEAsRR than for the *IIOA 
Original". 
In the case where IOA feels 
This criticality breakdown is as presented in IOA deliverable 2. 
"IOA RecommendedRv represents the final distribution of IOA FMEA 
criticalities after assessment. 
Table VI SUMMARY OF FCL CRITICAL ITEMS 
NASA 
Original 
~ 
IOA 
Recommendations 1 
for NASA FMEAs 
IOA 
Original 
IOA 
Recommended 1 1 1 5 7 1 3  
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4.2 Radiator and Flow Control Assembly Assessment Results 
The assessment of the Radiator and Flow Control Assembly (RFCA) FMEAs 
matched 52 IOA FMEAs to 43 NASA FMEAs. The 52 IOA FMEA worksheets 
came from the 40 original worksheets developed during the analysis 
phase, fifteen additional FMEA worksheets written during the 
assessment phase, and three of the original FMEAs deleted after re- 
examination. There were no IOA RFCA FMEAs which could not be mapped 
to corresponding NASA FMEAs. 
Six of the IOA FMEAs have suggested criticalities different than their 
NASA counterparts. The differences are due to inconsistencies in 
evaluation. IOA recommends that failures which are identical to each 
other (except for the cause) be assigned the same criticality. For 
example, a valve failing open due to a mechanical jam or an erroneous 
electrical signal (provided there is no way to remove or replace the 
signal) should be assigned the same criticality for each failure. All 
NASA 
Original 
IOA 
Recommendations 
for NASA FMEAs 
IOA 
Original 
IOA 
Recommended 
six of the issues are also CIL issues. 
1/1 2/1R 2/2 3/1R 3/2R 3/3 ? TOTAL 
43 - - 9 5 16 4 9 
- 10 5 16 2 9 1 43 
- - 22 11 - 40 7 - 
- 14 7 17 2 11 1 52 
Tables VI1 and VI11 present a summary of the results of the RFCA 
assessment. 
I 
~~ ~ 
Table VI1 SUMMARY OF RFCA FAILURE CRITICALITIES 
36 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
3/3 ? 
- - 
- - 
- - 
- - 
Table VI11 SUMMARY OF RFCA CRITICAL ITEMS 
TOTAL 
19 
19 
7 
2 5  
1 - 1  
IOA 
Recommendations - 10 
for NASA FMEAs 
1 - 1  ’ 
I Eommended I -L4  
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4.3 Flash Evaporator System Assessment Results 
During the assessment of the Flash Evaporator System (FES), a 
total of 163 IOA FMEAs were matched to 85 NASA/Rockwell FMEAs. 
This meant that a number of NASA FMEAs were matched to more than 
one IOA FMEA. The 163 IOA FMEAs came from the original 134 FMEAs 
developed during the analysis phase of the project, 30 new FMEAs 
developed during the assessment phase, ten original IOA FMEAs 
left unmatched during the assessment, and one original IOA FMEA 
deleted upon re-examination. 
The assessment process yielded 45 IOA FMEAs with recommended 
criticalities different than their NASA counterparts plus 10 
unmatched IOA FMEAs. Of these 55 issues, 11 are CIL issues. 
The 45 issues fall into five major categories. First, the NASA 
FMEA process assigned all failures which resulted in the loss of 
the topping evaporator a '1R' functional criticality. The loss 
of the topping evaporator results only in the loss of mission, 
not in the loss of crew or vehicle. It takes multiple unrelated 
failures of additional components of the ATCS to reach a '1R' 
criticality. Therefore, IOA recommends that the failures which 
result in the loss of the topping evaporator be assigned 
functional criticalities of '2R'. 
Second, IOA is recommending that failures which result in the 
loss of sensors or sensor data only, be assigned 3/3 
criticalities. Sensor failures can be worked, with the data 
being available from other sources. There is no impact on crew 
or vehicle safety, or on mission duration. 
NASA assigned failures which resulted in the loss of topping 
sonic nozzle, or high load nozzle heaters, 3/3 criticalities. 
Flight rules and procedures require that the nozzles reach a 
minimum temperature prior to activation of the evaporator. 
Therefore, if the heaters are inoperative it is possible for the 
nozzle to freeze up and the evaporator be considered lost. IOA, 
therefore, recommends that failures which result in the loss 
of the nozzle heaters be assigned the same functional 
criticalities as failures which result in the loss of the 
evaporator. 
The fourth category concerns the delineation of failures 
involving restricted flow of freon or freon leaks. NASA groups 
these failures into one for each type. IOA recommends that the 
failures be examined more closely for various locations of leaks 
or restrictions. 
The final issue category is the assignment of criticalities for 
backup and primary equipment. 
function and by 22206 should be assigned.the same criticalities. 
These both perform the same 
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The ten unmatched FMEAs can also be divided into major 
categories. First, there are six IOA FMEAs which deal with 
external leakage of water/steam from the evaporators or nozzles. 
These FMEAs all have 2/1R criticalities and should be 
investigated by NASA to determine credibility and applicability. 
Two unmapped FMEAs concern the failure of rotary switches to a 
given position. Although, NASA deemed this to be a non-credible 
failure mode, IOA feels that the possibility should re-examined 
and the failures re-instated. Finally, the remaining unmatched 
FMEAs involve sensor data or ground measurements and should be 
examined by NASA only in the interests of completeness. 
Tables IX and X present summaries of the FES assessment results. 
I 
I 
I 
Table X SUMMARY OF FES CRITICAL ITEMS 
I 
I 
NASA 
Original 
IOA 
Recommendations 
for NASA FMEAs 
IOA 
Original 
IOA 
Recommended 
- 1 - 1  17 
- 1 - 1  22 
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4.4 Ammonia Boiler System Assessment Results 
IOA 
Recommendations 
for NASA FMEAs 
During the assessment of the Ammonia Boiler System (ABS), forty 
IOA FMEAs were mapped to thirty-seven NASA FMEAs. The forty IOA 
FMEAs came from the original 28 ABS FMEA worksheets developed 
during the analysis phase, fourteen additional ABS FMEAs written 
during the assessment phase, and two of the original worksheets 
deleted after re-examination. Three of the IOA FMEA worksheets 
could not be mapped to equivalent NASA FMEAs. 
- 8 13 
The assessment process yielded six IOA FMEAs with recommended 
criticalities different from their NASA counterparts. Three of 
the FMEAs are recommended for criticality changes based on 
consistency with other ABS/ATCS FMEAs and are recommended for 1/1 
criticalities. The remaining three issues involve levels of 
redundancy with which IOA disagrees. In two of the cases there 
appear to be one less level of redundancy than NASA counted: the 
remaining issue appears to have an additional redundancy level 
not considered during NASAs evaluation. IOA recommends that all 
six of these FMEAs be re-examined by NASA and IOA, and the issues 
resolved as time permits. 
In addition to the six FMEAs with criticality differences, three 
of the original FMEAs were left unmatched. These three FMEA 
worksheets do have 3/3 criticality, but involve external leakage 
from valves or lines. For this reason, IOA recommends re- 
examination of the failures and upgrading the criticality if 
required. 
Of the nine identified issues, three are CIL issues. Tables XI 
and XI1 present summaries of the IOA assessment results. 
I Table XI SUMMARY OF ABS FAILURE CRITICALITIES I 
NASA 
Original 
I 2 1 l 1 1 -  
3/1R 
11 
9 
9 
3/2R 
7 
7 
15 
10 
4 0  
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 IOA 
Recommendations 
for NASA FMEAs 
Table XI1 I 
8 
I 5  
I 2 '  
1 Recommended IOA 1 8 
SUMMARY OF ABS CRITICAL ITEMS 
I 
I 
I 
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Instructions for Preparation of Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL), 
NSTS 22206 
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1 October 1987 
Summary Listing of ATCS Mechanical FMEA/CILs dated 
1 October 1987 
ATCS Mechanical Waiverable CILs, SSV88-12 
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APPENDIX A 
ACRONYMS 
APPENDIX A 
ACRONYMS 1 
ABS 
AC 
ACOD 
ALC 
ALCA 
AOA 
AOS 
ARS 
ASSY 
ATCS 
AT0 
BTU 
C&W 
CB 
CIL 
CNTLR 
CRIT 
D&C 
DIST 
DS 
ECLSS 
EMU 
EPDC 
EPS 
F 
F 
F 
FCA 
FCL 
FES 
FMEA 
FRAC 
ft 
GAS 
GFE 
GPC 
GSE 
H20 
HP 
hr 
Hw 
HX 
HZ 
ID 
INTCHGR 
IOA 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
- Ammonia Boiler System - Alternating Current - Anti-Carryover Device - Aft Load Controller - Aft Load Control Assembly - Abort-Once-Around - Acquisition of Signal - Atmospheric Revitalization System - Assembly - Active Thermal Control Subsystem - Abort-To-Orbit - British Thermal Units - Caution and Warning - Circuit Breaker - Critical Items List - Controller - Criticality - Displays and Controls - Distribution - Digital Signal - Environmental Control and Life Support System (Subsystem) - Extravehicular Mobility Unit - Electrical Power, Distribution and Control - Electrical Power System - Fahrenheit - Failed - Functional - Flow Control Assembly - Freon Coolant Loop - Flash Evaporator System - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis - Fraction - Feet - Get-Away Special - Government Furnished Equipment - General Purpose Computer - Ground Support Equipment - Water - Horsepower - Hour - Hardware - Heat Exchanger - Hertz - Identifier - Interchanger - Independent Orbiter Assessment 
A-2 
JSC 
LCA 
MC 
MDAC 
MDM 
MM 
NA 
NASA 
NC 
NH3 
NO 
NSTS 
02 
OPS 
P 
PASS 
PCA 
PCI 
PCN 
PNL 
R 
RAD 
RCS 
RFCA 
RGA 
RI 
RTLS 
SM 
SOP 
SSSH 
STS 
TAL 
TEMP 
VAC 
VRCS 
WP 
P/L 
ACRONYMS 
- Johnson Space Center - Load Controller Assembly - Memory Configuration - McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company - Multiplexer/Demultiplexer - Major Mode - Not Applicable - National Aeronautics and Space Administration - Normally Closed - Ammonia - Normally Open - National Space Transportation System - Oxygen - Operations Sequence - Pass - Payload - Primary Avionics Software System - Power Control Assembly - Potential Critical Item - Page Change Notice - Panel - Redundancy - Radiator - Reaction Control System - Radiator and Flow Control Assembly - Rate Gyro Assembly - Rockwell International - Return-to-Launch Site - Systems Management - Secondary Oxygen Pack - Space Shuttle Systems Handbook - Space Transportation System - Transatlantic Abort Landing - Temperature - Volts, ac - Vernier Reaction Control System - Working Paper 
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APPENDIX B 
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
B . l  Definitions 
B . 2  Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions 
B . 3  Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions 
B-1 
B . l  Definitions 
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions For PreDaration 
of FMEA/CIL. PCN-2, 6 A m i 1  1987, were used with the following 
amplifications and additions. 
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS: 
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and 
to OPS 9, post-flight 
- begins at declaration of the abort 
transition to OPS 9, post-flight 
- AOA - begins at declaration of the abort 
transition to OPS 9, post-flight 
&JQ - begins at declaration of the abort 
transition to OPS 9, post-flight 
ends at transition 
and ends at 
and ends at 
and ends at 
CREDIBLE ( CAUSE1 - an event that can be predicted or 
expected in anticipated operational environmental 
conditions. Excludes an event where multiple failures must 
first occur to result in environmental extremes 
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized 
beyond the standard malfunction procedures, pocket 
checklists, and cue cards 
W L Y  MISSION TERMINATION - termination of on-orbit phase 
prior to planned end of mission 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated 
the highest criticality 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality 
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis 
MAJOR MODE (MMI - major sub-mode of software operational 
sequence (OPS) 
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software 
System (PASS) 
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight 
with payload/objective accomplishments including orbit 
phasing and altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as 
GAS cans, middeck P/L, etc.) 
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a 
single cause or event of all units which perform a necessary 
(critical) function 
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized 
beyond the standard malfunction procedures, pocket 
checklists, and cue cards 
- OPS - software operational sequence 
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission 
objectives are equal to mission objectives 
PHASE DEFINITIONS: 
PRELAUN CH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter 
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff) 
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) 
and ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT) 
ON-ORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 
and ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8 
DE-ORBIT P HAS& - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode 
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown 
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear 
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing 
safing operations 
B-3 
B . 2  IOA Project L e v e l  G r o u n d  R u l e s  and A s s u m p t i o n s  I 
I The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for PreDaration of FME A/CIL. P CN-2. 6 A m i 1  1987, was employed with the 
following amplifications and additions. 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
The operational flight software is an accurate 
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements 
(FSSRs) . 
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of 
this task. 
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system 
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and 
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy 
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item. 
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability 
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew 
is beyond the scope of this task. 
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be 
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission 
being flown. 
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of 
.this task. 
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and 
assembled to the design specifications/drawings. 
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is 
designed to detect and identify problems 
before the item is approved for use. 
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed 
performed as written, and will not include human error in 
their performance. 
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error 
are out-of-scope of this task. 
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6 .  
7 .  
8 .  
9. 
10. 
11. 
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at 
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor 
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater 
hardware detail levels but not lesser. 
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with 
other analyses requires that both analyses 
be performed to a comparable level of 
detail. 
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually 
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not 
required. 
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry 
availability and/or the actual monitoring of 
applicable data by ground-based personnel is 
beyond the scope of this task. 
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the 
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed. 
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in 
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case 
effects for the phase of interest. 
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a 
thorough and complete analysis. 
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors 
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed 
nor FMEAs assessed. 
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior 
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection. 
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected 
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed. 
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior 
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection. 
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and 
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure 
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics. 
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to 
ensure consistency throughout IOA project. 
B-5 
B.3 ATCS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions 
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level 
of the ATCS subsystem. 
effects of the hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, 
mission, and crew and vehicle safety. 
The analysis considered the worst case 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
For redundancy definitions; the high load evaporator is not 
redundant to the topping evaporator during on-orbit operation. 
RATIONALE: During on-orbit operations, the topping 
evaporator is used: (1) to eliminate the 
excess heat load which cannot be handled by 
the radiators alone; and, (2) to provide an 
alternate means of performing a water dump. 
The topping evaporator operation also 
results in "balanced venting" with no 
propulsive effects. 
would operate erratically at the heat levels 
of the topping. The high load results in 
propulsive venting and concern for vehicle 
control if used with the VRCS. Payload 
contamination concerns also limit the use 
of the high load evaporator on orbit. Due 
to these negative effects, the high load 
evaporator cannot be considered as redundant 
to the topping evaporator. 
The high load evaporator 
Orbiter attitudes and payload cooling requirements 
necessitate the use of the topping evaporator for the entire 
mission. 
RATIONALE: Worst case, Some attitudes require only 
the radiators. Requiring the use of the 
FES for the entire mission results in a 
worst case scenario. 
The two exit duct/sonic nozzle systems for the topping 
evaporator are not redundant to each other. 
RATIONALE: The topping evaporator is sized to reject a 
given heat load with both nozzles 
operational. Loss of one duct/nozzle would 
reduce the operational heat load. 
Additionally, the configuration is such 
that the venting is nonpropulsive when 
both duct/nozzles are used. Using only one 
duct/nozzle would result in a propulsive 
venting with subsequent impacts on the 
attitude hold and RCS jet systems. 
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4 .  
5. 
6 .  
7 .  
8 .  
9.  
10. 
During ascent and entry, the high load evaporator is 
redundant to the freon coolant loops. 
RATIONALE: Definition of redundancy. Loss of both the 
high load evaporator and one freon loop can 
lead to the loss of crew/vehicle. Defining 
redundancy as above allows the end result 
to be reflected in the criticalities. 
Loss of the topping evaporator on-orbit, is a loss of 
mission. 
RATIONALE: The loss of the topping evaporator will 
mean attitude changes and power level 
reductions. These changes result in 
changes to the mission profile and mission 
length. Taken together, this means a loss 
of mission. 
During on-orbit operations, the FES and the fuel cell drain 
vent line provide an unlike redundancy to the water dump 
capability. 
RATIONALE: Conservative approach. If a leak in one of 
the feedlines occurs, then the steps to 
isolate the leak can also isolate the water 
dump system from the water tanks. When 
this occurs; the FES must function as an 
unlike redundancy item to dump excess water 
from the storage tanks. If leaks occur in 
both feedlines, they must be isolated 
leaving no "primary" method of dumping water. 
In analysis cases where the meaning of hardware item redundancy 
seems ambiguous, redundancy is understood to mean that there is 
one or more systems that are redundant to the system in which 
the hardware item occurs. 
RATIONALE: This is the most conservative assumption 
for purposes of determining criticality. 
L o s s  of redundancy means loss of all capability to perform 
function. 
RATIONALE: Maintain uniform usage within project. 
Caps and fittings for quick disconnects are considered one 
component. 
RATIONALE: This is the most conservative assumption. 
Leaks (GN2, hydraulic fluid, water) are sufficiently prolonged 
B-7 
11. 
in time to allow recognition and response. 
This assumption allows for non-trivial case 
analysis. 
RATIONALE: 
Contamination of all freon coolant loops during turnaround 
servicing is not considered a "single credible event" in 
evaluating Redundancy Screen C. 
RATIONALE: This is considered a ground operations problem 
although the significant number of inflight 
system anomalies attributed to contamination 
suggests that it should be analyzed 
independently as a potential cause of critical 
failure modes. Without this assumption, all 
system failure modes that list contamination 
as a cause would fail screen C. 
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APPENDIX C 
DETAILED ASSESSMENT 
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated 
during the assessment of the Active Thermal Control System. The 
information on these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the 
NASA FMEA/CIL (Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis 
worksheets included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets 
identifies the NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC 
Analysis Worksheet ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, 
redundancy screens, and recommendations. For each failure mode, 
the highest assessed hardware and functional criticality is 
, compared and discrepancies noted as ttNt8 in the compare row under 
the column where the discrepancy occurred. 
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS .................................. 
Hardware Criticalities: 
1 = Loss of life or vehicle 
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item 
3 = All others 
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle 
Functional Criticalities: 
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, 
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, 
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle 
if failed, could cause loss of mission 
Redundancy Screens A, B and C: 
P = Passed Screen 
F = Failed Screen 
NA = Not Applicable 
NASA Data : 
Baseline = NASA FMEA/CIL 
New = Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes 
CIL Item : 
X = Included in CIL 
Compare Row : 
N = Non compare for that column (deviation) 
c-1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1000 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0112-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1000 
ITEM: INLET SELF’-SEALING COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1001 
NASA F’MEA #: 06-3-0112-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1001 
ITEM: ORIFICE (INLET COUPLING) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  c I .  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA COMBINES PUMP INLET AND OUTLET COUPLINGS AND ORIFICES. 
THEREFORE, THIS FMEA IS BEING MATCHED TO NASA 06-3-0112-3. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1002 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0106-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1002 
ITEM: PUMP INLET PRESSURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 C P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N I  C N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
c 3 / 3  1 [ I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
SINCE CORRECT OPERATION OF THE PUMP CAN BE VERIFIED FROM 
ALTERNATE SOURCES OF DATA, IOA RECOMMENDS GIVING THIS SENSOR A 
3/3 CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1003 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0102-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1003 
ITEM: INLET FILTER (ACCUMULATOR) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1004 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0102-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1004 
ITEM: INLET FILTER (ACCUMULATOR) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 2 /1R 1 [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
THERE IS ONLY ONE PUMP INLET (ACCUMULATOR) FILTER PER LOOP. THIS 
MEANS THAT THE LOSS OF THIS ONE FILTER WILL CAUSE LOSS OF BOTH 
PUMPS (SWITCHING TO ALTERNATE PUMP DOES NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM). 
THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS THE 2/1R CRITICALITY, BUT AGREES 
WITH THE NASA SCREEN EVALUATION. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1005 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0103-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1005 
ITEM: ACCUMULATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C ,A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  E l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
r / I -  [ I  - r '  1 r I '  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1006 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0112-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1006 
ITEM: SELF-SEALING DISCONNECT 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FTJ?IC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ F l  [ F I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N I  I 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  1 1  ' [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA COMBINES ALL DISCONNECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUMP PACKAGE 
INTO ONE FMEA EVALUATED AT THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. FOR 
BETTER CLARITY, EACH DISCONNECT SHOULD BE EVALUATED SEPARATELY. 
HOWEVER, DUE TO THESE GROUNDRULE DIFFERENCES THERE IS NOT 
ENOUGH DATA TO EVALUATE DIFFERENCES AND MAKE A CRITICALITY 
RECOMMENDATION. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1007 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0105-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1007 
ITEM: QUANTITY SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  r 
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  r 
COMPARE [ /N ] C N I  [ N I  I 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
CIL 
ITEM 
C 
P I  
1 
N l  
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
I .  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
SENSOR DATA CAN BE DEDUCED FROM OTHER SOURCES. SENSOR FAILURE 
HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY OR MISSION COMPLETION. 
THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS THE 3/3 CRITICALITY AS BEING MORE 
REPRESENTATIVE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1008 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0104-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1008 
ITEM: INLET FILTER (FREON PUMP) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] E l  I N 1  I 1  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I .  [ 1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA COMBINES THE FILTERS AND THE CHECK VALVE INTO ONE FMEA. IOA 
AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES AND SCREENS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1009 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0104-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1009 
.ITEM: INLET FILTER (FREON PUMP) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /lR ] C F I  C F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 3  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  . I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA COMBINES THE FILTERS AND THE CHECK VALVES INTO ONE FMEA. 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES AND SCREEN RECOMMENDATIONS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1010 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0101-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1010 
ITEM: FREON PUMP 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B .  C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] C P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ . I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1011 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0101-3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1011 
ITEM: FREON PUMP 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / * I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1012 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-3-0101-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1012 
ITEM: 3-PHASE MOTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [: NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA COMBINES PUMP AND MOTOR INTO ONE F'MEA. AGREE WITH NASA 
CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1013 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1013 
ITEM: 3-PHASE MOTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
THIS FMEA IS WRITTEN FOR LOSS OF ONE PHASE OF A THREE-PHASE 
MOTOR. TAKEN TO THE WORST CASE, THE FAILURE BECOMES THE LOSS OF 
THE MOTOR WHICH IS ALREADY COVERED IN OTHER FMEAs. THEREFORE IOA 
IS DELETING THIS FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1014 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0104-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1014 
ITEM: OUTLET FILTER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 C F I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  C F I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ N l  [ I  [ I  [ : I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
THERE IS ONE FILTER ASSOCIATED WITH EACH CHECK VALVE/PUMP. 
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO ONE FILTER MIGHT CLOG ONE CHECK VALVE, BUT 
THE ALTERNATE LEG WOULD STILL BE OPERATIONAL AS WELL AS THE 
ALTERNATE FREON LOOP. THEREFORE, IOA AGREES WITH NASA 
CRITICALITIES AND SCREENS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1015 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0104-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1015 
ITEM: OUTLET FILTER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B ,  C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  C P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r I '  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / . I  [ I  'C 1 [ . I .  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 - 
REMARKS : 
NASA COMBINES THE FILTERS AND CHECK VALVE INTO ONE FMEA. IOA 
AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES AND SCREENS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1016 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0108-2 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1016 
ITEM: CHECK VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FTJNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
’ [  1 
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ / I  E l  [ I  ‘ [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1017 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0112-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1017 
ITEM: OUTLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1018 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0112-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1018 
ITEM: ORIFICE (OUTLET COUPLING) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
NASA COMBINES ALL DISCONNECTS AND ORIFICES ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
PUMP PACKAGE INTO ONE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1019 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0207-1 
ATCS 
1019 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
t / l  [ ’  1 [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
.I 
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-2 1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1020 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0207-6 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1020 
ITEM: FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  C P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  C P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-22 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1021 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0207-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1021 
ITEM: FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGERS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON WORST CASE EFFECTS OCCURING 
DURING ASCENT. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-23 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1022 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0207-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1022 
ITEM: FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  I 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-24 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1023 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0207-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS . 
MDAC ID: 1023 
ITEM: FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA ( 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-25 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1024 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0207-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ’ ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1024 
ITEM: FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-26 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/(15/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1025 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0301-3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1025 
ITEM: HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.R. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE NASA CRITICALITY HAS BEEN CHANGED IN A CCB. IOA DOES NOT 
HAVE THE APPROPRIATE PAPERWORK AT THIS TIME. THEREFORE, IOA 
RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE IOA CRITICALITY WHICH WILL BE THE 
REVISED NASA CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-27 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1026 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0301-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
1026 
HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGERS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 1 
NEW [ X ] 
I HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] I 
~ INADEQUATE 5 j 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-28 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1027 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1027 
ITEM: HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGERS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA r / 1 ( 1  [ I  C l  r I *  
[ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  C N I  [ N I  [ N l  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-29 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
A88E88MENT ID: JLTCa-10111 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0301-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1028 
ITEM: HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-30 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1029 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0301-5 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1029 
ITEM: HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ X I  
[ N l  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ D l  
(ADD/DElXTE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMAFUZS: 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES FOR ALL FLIGHT PHASES. THE IOA 
CRITICALITY FOR THE ABORT PHASE IS A 1/1, BUT ADDITIONAL DATA 
ALLOWS IOA TO AGREE WITH NASA IN RECOMMENDING THE LOWER 
CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-31 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1030 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0301-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1030 
ITEM: HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/J?UNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-32 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1031 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0301-6 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1031 
ITEM: HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  C N I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
ALTERNATE METHODS EXIST TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEM OF RESTRICTED 
HYDRAULIC FLUID FLOW. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL ALTERNATE METHODS 
COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM AND SUBSEQUENT 
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION BY FLIGHT RULES. THEREFORE, IOA 
RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R CRITICALITY. 
1 
I REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-3 3 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1032 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0304-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1032 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-34 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1033 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0304-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1033 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  c 3  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-35 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1034 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0390-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1034 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGERS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* C I L  RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-36 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1035 
NASA FMEA #:  06-3-0304-5 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1035 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  E l  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
THIS FAILURE AFFECTS GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY, NOT ON-ORBIT OPS. 
THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS THE 3/3 CRITICALITY. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-37 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1036 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0304-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1036 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-38 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1037 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1037 
ITEM: 02 RESTRICTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW r 1 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA IN-THIS PACKAGE. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-39 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1038 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW 1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1038 
ITEM: 02 RESTRICTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If d i f f e r e n t  from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA DEEMED THIS TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE REQUIRING TWO 
SEPARATE FAILURES (06-3-0250-1). IOA FEELS THIS FAILURE MODE 
SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED TO DETERMINE THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE 
CONCERN AND RE-INSTATE THE FAILURE IF REQUIRED. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-40 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1039 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0201-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1039 
ITEM: ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
C I L  
ITEM 
[ X I *  
C X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
' I  / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-41 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1040 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-3-0201-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1040 
ITEM: ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  C I  ,[ 1 [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARXS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-42 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1041 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0201-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1041 
ITEM: ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
/ 1 1 I 1 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ X I  
[ I  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
I 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-43 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1/06/8 8 
ATCS- 104 2 
06-3-0390-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
ATCS 
1042 
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER 
S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-44 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1043 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW r 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1043 
ITEM: ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA c / I e 1  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  
C I  
[ P I  
c I *  
[ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  [ N l  [ N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA IN THIS PACKAGE. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-45 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1044 BASELINE [ 3 
06-3-0201-1 NEW [ X ] NASA F'MEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1044 
ITEM: ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . R .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] t l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  E l  1 1  [ I  
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-46 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1045 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1045 
ITEM: ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  E l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA IN THIS PACKAGE. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-47 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1046 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0202-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1046 
ITEM: INLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  c 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
1 [ I  
1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-48 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1047 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0203-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1047 
ITEM: FLOW RATE SENSOR INTERCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
THIS SENSOR DRIVES A C&W LIGHT AND A METER DISPLAY. 
ALTERNATE DATA SOURCES CAN BE USED TO DETERMINE THE CORRECT 
OPERATION OF THE FREON LOOP. LOSS OF THIS SENSOR WILL NOT AFFECT 
CRITICALITY. 
HOWEVER, 
CONTINUED OPERATIONS. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/3 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-49 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1048 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0223-4 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1048 
ITEM: PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 I 
I 
I 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NO ISSUE WITH NASA EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
1 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1049 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0223-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1049 
ITEM: PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-51 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1050 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1050 
ITEM: PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N I C N I  C N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA IN THIS PACKAGE. CRITICALITY IS BEING 
CHANGED TO REFLECT CORRECT DATA. INCORRECT ENTRY INADVERTENTLY 
PICKED UP IN DATA BASE ENTRIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-52 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1051 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0390-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1051 
ITEM: PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1052 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1052 
ITEM: PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  E N 1  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE 5 j 
REMARKS : 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA IN THIS PACKAGE. CRITICALITY IS BEING 
CHANGED TO REFLECT CORRECT DATA. INCORRECT ENTRY INADVERTENTLY 
PICKED UP IN DATA BASE ENTRIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1053 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0223-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1053 
ITEM: PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 I 1  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 2 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THIS FAILURE DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE FREON LOOP RATHER THAN THE 
PAYLOAD COOLANT LOOP. THE RESTRICTION AFFECTS THE ENTIRE LOOP 
AND NOT JUST AT THE PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER. THE FAILURE CAN 
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP WHICH MEANS IOA RECOMMENDS 
THE 2/1R CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-55 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1054 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0224-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1054 
ITEM: FLOW RATE SENSOR PAYLOAD HX 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] C N I  C N I  [ N l  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
E 3 / 3  1 [ I  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF THE SENSOR DOES NOT MEAN LOSS OF THE MISSION, CREW, OR 
VEHICLE. THE DATA CAN BE OBTAINED FROM ALTERNATE SOURCES. 
THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/3 CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-56 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1055 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-02 12-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1055 
ITEM: SERVICING QUICK DISCONNECT CAP 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ : X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] C F I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different f rorn NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
A CAP FAILING TO REMAIN CLOSED IS A WORST CASE CONDITION OF 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES AND NASA 
SCREENS. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-57 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESS-NT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1056 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0390-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1056 
ITEM: FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1057 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0220-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1057 
ITEM: FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  C P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  C P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E X 1  * 
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-59 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1058 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0220-3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1058 
ITEM: FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W C X l  
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA FMEA WRITTEN AGAINST FAILURE TO OPERATE IN COOLANT - 
PAYLOAD. THE CRITICALITITES ALSO ASSUME A WORST CASE CONDITION 
OF REQUIRING BOTH FREON LOOPS FOR ADEQUATE COOLING OF THE 
PAYLOAD. LOSS OF COOLANT TO THE PAYLOAD WHEN REQUIRED BY MISSION 
OBJECTIVES WILL MEAN A LOSS OF MISSION. AGREE WITH NASA 
CRITICALITIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-60 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1058A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0220-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1058 
ITEM: FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  C I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
FAILS TO OPERATE COOLANT - INTERCHANGER. AGREE WITH NASA 
CRITICALITIES. IF THE VALVE FAILS TO OPERATE IN A MANNER WHICH 
PREVENTS SUFFICIENT FLOW FROM REACHING THE INTERCHANGER, VEHICLE 
COOLING MAY BE LOST. LOSS OF FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVES IN 
BOTH FREON LOOPS CAN LEAD TO THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-61 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1059 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0220-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1059 
ITEM: ACTUATOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different f ram NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAs CONSIDER THE ACTUATOR AS A PART OF THE OVERALL VALVE 
MODULE. WORST CASE OF THE IOA ACTUATOR FAILURE WOULD BE FOR THE 
VALVE TO REMAIN STUCK IN THE PAYLOAD POSITION. THIS LEADS TO 
INADEQUATE FLOW TO THE INTERCHANGER. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, 
IOA AGREES WITH THE CRITICALITY OF THE CITED NASA FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1060 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0390-1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1060 
ITEM: MIDBODY COLDPLATES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A - .  B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 1  [ I  r I '  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1061 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0215-2 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1061 
ITEM: MIDBODY COLDPLATES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C . . A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  I 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ 1 .  [ 1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-64 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1062 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0215-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1062 
ITEM: MIDBODY COLDPLATES 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
NO ISSUE WITH SCREEN B - ACCEPT NASA RECOMMENDATION. 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1063 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0307-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1063 
ITEM: ORIFICE (AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA COMBINED THE FAILURE IN THE ORIFICE WITH A FAILURE OF THE 
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1064 BASELINE [ ] 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0309-1 NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1064 
ITEM: AFT COLDPLATE NETWORK FLOWRATE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF THE SENSOR WILL NOT MEAN LOSS OF THE MISSION OR LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE. THE DATA AVAILABLE FROM THE SENSOR CAN BE OBTAINED 
FROM ALTERNATE SOURCES. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS THE 3/3 
CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1065 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0390-1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1065 
ITEM: AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] E l  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1066 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0307-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1066 
ITEM: AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1067 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0307-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1067 
ITEM: AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1068 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1068 
ITEM: ORIFICE (RGA COLDPLATES) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW 1 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1  I 1  [ I  [ I  E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. THE ORIFICES ACT AS BYPASS LOOPS AROUND 
THE RGA COLDPLATES FOR EXCESS FREON. NASA FMEAS ONLY COVER THE 
CASE OF RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE RGA COLDPLATES WITH NO 
MENTION OF THE ORIFICES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-71 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1069 
NASA FMEA t: 06-3-0230-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1069 
ITEM: RGA COLDPLATES 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  I-  1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1070 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0390-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1070 
ITEM: RGA COLDPLATES 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B . c  
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  C P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
[ I  E l  [ I  COMPARE [ / 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C I '  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ I  [ / I  C l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1071 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0230-1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1071 
ITEM: RGA COLDPLATES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A - B  C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 I 1  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1072 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0390-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1072 
ITEM: FREON LOOP LINES AND FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] ( 3  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ 1 -  [ 1 [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1073 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2004-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1073 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKERS (FREON PUMP) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . , K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I - [ ]  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO ONE PUMP WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS 
OF THE PUMP. LOSS OF BOTH PUMPS ON ONE LOOP MEANS THE LOSS OF 
THE LOOP. EVEN THOUGH IT REQUIRES A LARGE NUMBER OF FAILURES TO 
REACH THE 1R CRITICALITY, IT IS A POSSIBLE CHAIN OF EVENTS. 
UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1074 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2045-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1074 
ITEM: SWITCH (FREON PUMPS) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
. . HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 C P I  [ P I  [ P I  C I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  C '  1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITY. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1075 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2045-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1075 
ITEM: SWITCH (FREON PUMPS) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / , I  [ I  [ I  [ I  I 1  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-78 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1076 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2045-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1076 
ITEM: SWITCH (FREON PUMPS) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR . 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (1f.different from NASA) 
(AD: 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ X I  
D l  
/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. FOR EACH LOOP, THE PUMPS CAN 
BE STARTED WITH THE SWITCH OR PUMP B CAN BE STARTED WITH A GPC 
COMMAND. THIS ADDS ANOTHER LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY TO THE SWITCH. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1077 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6W-2085-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1077 
ITEM: RESISTOR (FREON PUMPS) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K. S.INCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C l  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1078 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1078 
ITEM: RESISTOR (FREON PUMPS) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  C I  C I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  I 1  C I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
DELETE - NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1079 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2256-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
ATCS 
1079 
MDM BLOCKING DIODE (FREON PUMPS) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR I 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
I 
1 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  c 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) I 
I [ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  (ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THE GPC COMMAND PATH IS A BACKUP TO THE SWITCH. THEREFORE, THE 
TWO PATHS SHOULD CARRY THE SAME CRITICALITY. IOA AGREES WITH 
NASA CRITICALITIES AND WITH THE EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. I 
R 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1080 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6W-2256-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1080 
ITEM: MDM BLOCKING DIODE (FREON PUMPS) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
c / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. THE INPUT TO THE MDM CANNOT 
BE DAMAGED BY REVERSE CURRENT. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-83 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1081 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2202-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1081 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (FREON PUMPS) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ N l  E l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-84 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1082 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2202-3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1082 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (FREON PUMPS) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA 3 /2R ] E P I  E P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  I N 1  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r / 1  r i  [ I  E l  C I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITS. WORST CASE IS A CONTINUOUSLY ACTIVATED 
PUMP. 
ADEQUATE ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-85 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1083 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2126-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1083 
ITEM: RELAY SOLENOID (FREON PUMPS) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [- 1 [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES AND EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-86 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1084 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1084 
ITEM: RELAY SOLENOID (FREON PUMPS) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA r / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA CONSIDERS THIS A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (05-6W-2126-3). 
IOA AGREES AND WILL DELETE THIS FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-87 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1085 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2008-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1085 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER (FREON FLOW PROPORTIONING) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  C I  C I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-88 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1086 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2043-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1086 
ITEM: SWITCH (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . R .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  C P I  C X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C l  C l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
- [  / 1 C l  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
I 
I REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-89 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1087 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2043-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1087 
ITEM: SWITCH (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] E l  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  [ N l  [ N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ I  C l  [ / I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
WORST CASE IS AN INABILITY TO PROVIDE PAYLOAD WITH REQUIRED 
COOLING. IF THE PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVE REQUIRES THE COOLING 
PROVIDED BY BOTH FREON LOOPS, LOSS OF FLOW THRU THE PAYLOAD HEAT 
EXCHANGER WILL MEAN A LOSS OF MISSION. IN THIS CASE IT 
IS ASSUMED THAT THE PAYLOAD REQUIRES FLOW FROM BOTH FREON LOOPS 
AND LOSS OF ONE WILL CAUSE WORST CASE EFFECTS TO OCCUR. 
THEREFORE, IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-90 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1088 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2043-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1088 
ITEM: SWITCH 21 (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  [ N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
[ N I  
[ / I  [ I  I 1  r 'I C A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IF THE SWITCH IS FAILED IN THE PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER POSITION, 
THEN INSUFFICIENT FREON WILL FLOW THROUGH THE ARS INTERCHANGER 
RESULTING IN INADEQUATE VEHICLE COOLING. THEREFORE, IOA AGREES 
WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
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REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-91 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1089 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0217-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1089 
ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONER (ATCS OF1) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ ‘I [ I  C D I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THE SIGNAL CONDITIONER PROVIDES A POWER SOURCE FOR FREON LOOP 
SENSOR DATA: ERRONEOUS DATA WOULD MEAN INCORRECT FREON LOOP 
PARAMETERS. WORST CASE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ALL SENSOR DATA 
ON FREON LOOP. HOWEVER, FREON LOOP CAN BE MONITORED USING 
ALTERNATE DATA SOURCES. THEREFORE, THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED TO HAVE NO EFFECT. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-92 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1090 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2081-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1090 
ITEM: RESISTOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  J [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-93 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1091 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1091 
ITEM: RESISTOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  C I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DELETE - NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-94 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE : 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
I 
1/07/88 
ATCS - 109 2 
05-6W-2257-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
ATCS 
1092 
BLOCKING DIODE ( INTERCHANGER) 
S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  E l  r I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  r I ' E  1 ' [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-95 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1093 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2257-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1093 
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODE (INTERCHANGER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
[ I *  
[ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  . [  1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-96 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1094 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2257-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1094 
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODE (PAYLOAD HX) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 1  [ I  [ I  1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-97 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1095 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2257-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1095 
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODE (PAYLOAD HX) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  E l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: , (If different from NASA) 
E l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-98 
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~' APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1096 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2151-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1096 
ITEM: INDICATOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B .  C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r /. 1 [ I  [ I  I 1  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] - 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-99 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1097 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2151-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1097 
ITEM: INDICATOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A .  B C 
NASA ( 3 /3 3 [ I  E l  [ I  I *  
IOA ( 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
. E / ]  [ I  C l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-100 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1098 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2151-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1098 
ITEM: INDICATOR (FLOW PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  C l  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-101 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1099 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2001-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1099 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ 
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  c 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  
1 
1 
1 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
- 1  1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-102 
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~I APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1100 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2001-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1100 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ .  1 
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
WORST CASE IS A LOSS OF SENSOR DATA. INFORMATION CAN BE OBTAINED 
AND FREON LOOP PERFORMANCE MONITORED FROM ALTERNATE SOURCES. 
THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS 3/3 CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1101 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2041-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1101 
ITEM: SWITCH 10 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N I  I N 1  I N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  I I '  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
WORST CASE IS A LOSS OF SENSOR DATA. INFORMATION CAN BE OBTAINED 
AND FREON LOOP PERFORMANCE MONITORED FROM ALTERNATE SOURCES. 
THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1102 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2041-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1102 
ITEM: SWITCH 10 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  1 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 ’ [  1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
WORST CASE IS A LOSS OF SENSOR DATA. INFORMATION CAN BE OBTAINED 
AND FREON LOOP 
THEREFORE, IOA 
PERFORMANCE MONITORED FROM ALTERNATE SOURCES. 
RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1103 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2041-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1103 
ITEM: SWITCH 10 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  C I  [ I  1. 1 
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
WORST CASE RESULT IS A LOSS OF SENSOR DATA. INFORMATION CAN BE 
OBTAINED AND FREON LOOP PERFORMANCE MONITORED FROM ALTERNATE 
SOURCES. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1104 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2057-1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1104 
ITEM: SWITCH 4 (FREON) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C . A  B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 I 1  E l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
r / I . [  1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE ( 3 
INADEQUATE ( ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1105 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2356-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W C X I  
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1105 
ITEM: FREON FLOW VOLTMETER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . R .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3. /3 I [ I  [ I  C l  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
WORST CASE IS LOSS OF DISPLAY DATA WITH NO EFFECT ON SAFETY OR 
OPERATIONS. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS THE LOWER CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1106 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2357-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1106 
ITEM: FREON EVAPORATOR OUTLET TEMPERATURE V O L m T E R  
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  .I [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1107 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW r 1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 1107 
ITEM: FREON C&W LIGHT 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B ’ C  
COMPARE [ N /N J [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
1 / I .  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA IN THIS PACKAGE. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2000 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0520-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2000 
ITEM: INLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  C I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2001 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0520-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2001 
ITEM: OUTLET SELF-SEALING COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
C X l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2002 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0580-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2002 
ITEM: FLEX HOSES,MANIFOLDS, TUBES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA 1 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE 1 / ] [ I  [ I  I 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2003 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0502-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2003 
ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
I 1  1 1  [ I  1 3  COMPARE 1 / 3 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  I 1  C A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE 1 ] 
REMARKS: 
FAILING THE VALVE IN THE BYPASS POSITION WILL ELIMINATE RADIATOR 
FLOW REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE (MECHANICAL OR ELECTRICAL). LOSS OF 
FLOW THROUGH THE RADIATOR IS A LOSS OF MISSION. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2003A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0502-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2003 
ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  E l  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  I N 1  C N I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NASA SEPARATED THE FAILURE ACCORDING TO MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL 
CAUSES. REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE, THE FAILURE HAS THE SAME EFFECT 
AND THEREFORE THE CRITICALITIES SHOULD BE CONSISTENT. IOA AGREES 
WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2004 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0502-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2004 
ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNED BASED ON FINAL EFFECT BEING SUPER- 
COOLED FREON FREEZING AND RUPTURING THE INTERCHANGER. BASED ON 
THIS SCENARIO, IOA AGREES WITH NASA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2004A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0502-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2004 
ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
1 / 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATED THE FAILURE BY MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL 
CAUSES. ADDITIONALLY, THE WORST CASE WAS BASED ON SUPER-COOLED 
FREON FREEZING AND RUPTURING THE INTERCHANGER. IOA AGREES WITH 
NASA CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2005 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0520-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2005 
ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2006 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0502-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2006 
ITEM: STEPPING MOTOR (FLOW CONTROL VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I -  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAs COMBINE THE VALVE AND MOTOR INTO ONE. IOA AGREES WITH 
THE CRITICALITY BASED ON THE WORST CASE OF THE STEPPING MOTOR 
BEING STOPPED WHEN THE VALVE IS IN THE NORMAL POSITION WHICH CAN 
LEAD TO SUPER-COOLED FREON IN LOOP. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2007 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0504-3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2007 
ITEM: BYPASS VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
N E W [ X l  
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 J [ I  [ I  E l  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE N /N J C N I  [ N l  E N 1  E N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 3  I 1  r 3 -  c 1 [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
FAILING THE VALVE IN THE BYPASS POSITION WILL ELIMINATE THE 
COOLING FROM ONE RADIATOR WHICH RESULTS IN A MINIMUM DURATION 
FLIGHT AND LOSS OF MISSION. THEREFORE, IOA AGREES WITH NASA 
CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2007A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0504-4 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2007 
ITEM: BYPASS VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C 'A. B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  C '  3 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA SEPARATED THE VALVE FAILURE INTO TWO FMEAs BASED ON CAUSE - 
ONE FOR ELECTRICAL AND ONE FOR MECHANICAL. REGARDLESS OF THE 
CAUSE, THE RESULT OF FAILING THE VALVE I N  THE BYPASS POSITION IS 
THE SAME AND THEREFORE THE CRITICALITIES SHOULD BE 
CONSISTENT. IOA RECOMMENDS A "2/2" CRITICALITY BASED ON LOSS OF 
MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH RADIATOR. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1/13/88 
ATCS-2 0 08 
06-3-0504-1 
ATCS 
2008 
BYPASS VALVE 
S.K. SINCLAIR 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 1 1  C N I  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ : I  [ : '  1 [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. WORST CASE RESULT OF STICKING 
BYPASS VALVE IN THE RAD FLOW POSITION IS EXCESSIVE COOLING OF 
FREON WITH LOSS OF TEMPERATURE CONTROL. AGREE WITH NASA 
EVALUATION OF SCREEN B IN ABSENCE OF CONFLICTING DATA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2008A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0504-2 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2008 
ITEM: BYPASS VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] 1 1  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
[ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA SEPARATES FAILURE INTO TWO FMEAs BASED ON CAUSE (MECHANICAL 
AND ELECTRICAL). REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE, THE RESULT IS THE 
SAME, AND THE CRITICALITIES SHOULD BE CONSISTENT. THERFORE, IOA 
RECOMMENDS THE 2/1R CRITICALITY WITH SCREENS AS RECOMMENDED 
BY NASA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2009 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0520-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2009 
ITEM: BYPASS VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2010 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0504-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2010 
ITEM: MOTOR (BYPASS VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E 2 /1R 1 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA COMBINES THE MOTOR AND VALVE INTO A SINGLE FMEA. IOA 
RECOMMENDS THE HIGHER CRITICALITY BASED ON OTHER FMEAs IN 
PACKAGE. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-125 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2011 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0520-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2011 
ITEM: MODE CONTROL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] 1 1  [ I  E l  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2012 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0505-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2012 
ITEM: RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER 
LEAD ANALYST: . S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA ( 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  I N 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 3  1 3  1 1  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. LOSS OF ALL CONTROLLERS MEANS 
LOSS OF ALL RAD FLOW WHICH CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-127 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2013 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0510-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2013 
ITEM: INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C l  [ I  C l  c I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASBESSbdENT OATEa 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2014 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0510-1 
NASA DATAa 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW ( X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2014 
ITEM: OUTLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  C l  [ : I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] C l  [ I  C l  [ I  
COMPARE ( / ] C l  I 1  C l  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I: 1 -  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  1 1  [ I  I 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE ( 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2015 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0507-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2015 
ITEM: TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
- [  1 
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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~I APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2015A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0508-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2015 
ITEM: TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2015B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0508-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2015 
ITEM: TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  I F 1  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  I 1  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 / 3  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. FAILING THE SENSOR OFF SCALE HIGH 
WILL RESULT IN SUPER-COOLED FREON WITH SUBSEQUENT DOWNSTREAM 
PROBLEMS. AGREE WITH EVALUATION OF SCREEN B IN ABSENCE OF 
CONFLICTING DATA. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1/13/80 
ATCS - 2 0 15C 
06-3-0507-2 
ATCS 
2015 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
S . K .  SINCLAIR 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  1 I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ -  1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. FAILING THE SENSOR OFF SCALE HIGH 
WILL ALLOW FREON TO GET TOO COLD WITH SUBSEQUENT DOWNSTREAM 
SUPER-COOLING AND POSSIBLE RUPTURE/FREEZING OF INTERCHANGER. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2016 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2010-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2016 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER 14 (FREON RADIATOR CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: . S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I "  
IOA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
I / - 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES AND EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2017 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2034-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2017 
ITEM: SWITCH 26 (RADIATOR CONTROL LOOP) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] E l  [ N l  E l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF ONE CONTROLLER DOES NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF THE RADIATOR. 
THEREFORE, RECOMMEND A HARDWARE CRIT OF "318 BUT WITH THE l'lR" 
FUNCTIONAL CRIT SINCE LOSS OF ALL CONTROLLERS PLUS LOSS OF 
ADDITIONAL COOLING CAN CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2017A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2034-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2017 
ITEM: SWITCH 26 (RADIATOR CONTROL LOOP) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] I 1  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  0 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF BOTH CONTROLLERS ON ONE LOOP WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF THAT 
RADIATOR. LOSS OF ONE RADIATOR IS A MIN. DURATION FLIGHT AND 
THEREFORE A LOSS OF MISSION. IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES 
AND SCREENS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2018 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2034-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2018 
ITEM: SWITCH 26 (RADIATOR CONTROL LOOP) 
LEAD ANALYST: S. K. SINCLAXR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  c I "  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : {If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL 
RADIATOR FLOW CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2019 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2252-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2019 
ITEM: DIODE (RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  c NAJ c p 1  
COMPARE [ /N I C I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ I  1 / 1  I 1  e 1  
I 
R 
* C I L  RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2020 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2252-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2020 
ITEM: DIODE (RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N I  [ N I  I N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  [ I  I 1  I 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2021 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2080-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2021 
ITEM: RESISTOR (RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 1 .  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2022 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2022 
ITEM: RESISTOR (RADIATOR FLOW CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA r / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1  [ I  C ]  [ I  E l  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
DELETE - NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2023 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2038-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2023 
ITEM: SWITCH 25 (RADIATOR CONTROL OUTLET TEMPERATURE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  C I  [ 1 ’ [  1 1’ 1 
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
RADIATOR CONTROL IS STILL FUNCTIONAL AND THE TEMPERATURE IS 
CONTROLLED TO 38 DEGREES F. THE ONLY ITEMS LOST ARE THE 
CAPABILITY TO USE FES AS AN ALTERNATE METHOD OF DUMPING WATER 
(CONTROLLING TO HIGHER TEMPERATURE), OR USING THE HIGH SETTING 
FOR COLD-SOAKING THE RADIATORS. IOA AGREES WITH NASA 
CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2024 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2038-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2024 
ITEM: SWITCH 25 (RADIATOR CONTROL OUTLET TEMPERATURE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.R. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  C N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  C I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARXS : 
FAILING THE SWITCH IN HIGH WILL ESSENTIALLY ELIMINATE COOLING 
FROM ONE RADIATOR. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS ARE CAUSED BY THE 
INCREASED WATER USAGE BY THE FES TO MAINTAIN REQUIRED COOLING 
TO A LOSS OF MISSION. THEREFORE, IOA AGREES WITH NASA 
CRITICALITIES. 
LEVELS. THE LOSS OF COOLING PLUS WATER MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS LEADS 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2025 BASELINE [ 3 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2014-1 NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2025 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER (RADIATOR BYPASS VLV) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
C 
P I  
P I  
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  E 
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ I  [ N l  [ 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA 
1 1 3  [ I  [ I  [ 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ A I  
ADD/ DELETE 
I 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2026 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2036-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2026 
ITEM: SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC . A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ . I '  [ I  '[ 1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL 
BYPASS VALVE MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF COOLING OR TO EXCESSIVE COOLING 
DUE TO SUPER-COOLED FREON. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2027 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2036-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2027 
ITEM: SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2028 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2036-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2028 
ITEM: SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B -  . C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ I  
[ N l  
[ I  [ I  [ I  r .  1 
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NOT ENOUGH DATA TO RESOLVE AT THIS TIME. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2029 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2 082-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2029 
ITEM: RESISTOR (PRECEDES S35) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A . .  B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 E l  C l  E l  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. WORST CASE RESULTS CAN LEAD TO A 
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2030 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2030 
ITEM: RESISTOR (PRECEDES S35) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B . c  
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  [ N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  C l  r I .  r 1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
DELETE - NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2031 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2032-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2031 
ITEM: SWITCH 35 (RADIATOR CONTROLLER BYPASS VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A .B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  1 I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 1 [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  I I .  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES AND EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. LOSS 
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL THE RADIATORS CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2032 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2032-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2032 
ITEM: SWITCH 35 (RADIATOR CONTROLLER BYPASS VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
r / I '  [ I  1 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES AND EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2033 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2203-1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2033 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ I  
[ N l  
[ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. LOSS OF ALL ABILITY TO CONTROL 
THE RADIATOR FLOW CAN RESULT IN A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. AGREE 
WITH SCREEN B DUE TO LACK OF CONFLICTING DATA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2034 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2203-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2034 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N I  [ N l  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. PREMATURE ACTIVATION OF THE 
HYBRID DRIVER CAN LEAD TO INCORRECT COMMANDS BEING SENT TO THE 
VALVE AND INCORRECT VALVE POSITIONING. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2035 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2097-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2035 
ITEM: RESISTOR (BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  E l  1 1  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ I 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2036 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2036 
ITEM: RESISTOR (BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
DELETE - NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2037 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6W-2254-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2037 
ITEM: DIODE (BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  E l  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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ASSESSMENT DATE : 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1/12/88 
ATCS-2038 
05-6W-2254-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
ATCS 
2038 
DIODE (BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR) 
S.K. SINCLAIR 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2039 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2 152-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2039 
ITEM: BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 1 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2039A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0503-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 2039 
ITEM: BYPASS VALVE INDICATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ -1 [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3000 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0328-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3000 
ITEM: FES HI LOAD FEEDLINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 3  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3001 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3991 
ITEM: HI LOAD FEEDLINE FROM CUT-OFF TO NOZZLE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E l  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  C I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NO ISSUE WITH SCREEN B - ACCEPT NASA's RECOMMENDATION. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3002 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3002 
ITEM: HI LOAD FEEDLINE FROM CUT OFF TO NOZZLE 
( PLUMBING) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 1 1  C N I  C I  
CIL 
ITEM 
1 I *  
[ I  
C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NO ISSUE WITH SCREEN B - ACCEPT NASA's RECOMMENDATION. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3003 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-4 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3003 
ITEM: FES HI LOAD FEEDLINE HEATER 
.LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3004 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3004 
ITEM: FES HI LOAD FEEDLINE HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR, 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  J 1 3  c 3  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONSIDERS A FAILED ON HEATER TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. 
THE SAME EFFECT IS ACHIEVED BY FAILING THE ASSOCIATED THERMOSTAT 
TO ALWAYS REFLECT A L O W  TEMPERATURE - KEEPING THE HEATERS ON. 
IOA AGREES WITH THE CRITICALITY IF THE FAILURE MODE IS 
CHANGED FROM A FAILED ON HEATER TO A FAILED OFF THERMOSTAT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1 2 / 2 2 j 8 7  
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3005 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-4 I 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3005 
ITEM: FES HI LOAD FEEDLINE HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
I ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
1 RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I [ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  (ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
A FAILED OPEN THERMOSTAT IS EQUIVALENT TO A FAILED OFF HEATER. 
THEREFORE, IOA IS MATCHING THIS FMEA TO THE NASA FMEA FOR A NON- 
OPERATING HEATER. 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3006 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0322-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3006 
ITEM: 40 MICRON FILTER-HI LOAD WATER VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FVNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
ACCEPT NASA's RECOMMENDATION ON SCREEN B. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3007 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0322-3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3007 
ITEM: HI LOAD ISOLATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
C N I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH THE SCREEN B FAILURE ON THIS ITEM SINCE AN 
ISOLATION VALVE FAILING OPEN CAN BE MASKED BY A PROPERLY 
OPERATING PULSER VALVE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3008 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0322-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3008 
ITEM: HI LOAD ISOLATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  I 1  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3009 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0322-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3009 
ITEM: HI LOAD PULSER VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  L: NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  C l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-169 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3010 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0322-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3010 
ITEM: HI LOAD PULSER VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH THE SCREEN B FAILURE OF THIS ITEM SINCE A FAILED 
OPEN PULSER VALVE CAN BE MASKED BY A PROPERLY OPERATING ISOLATION 
VALVE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
I 
I 
I 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3011 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0322-4 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3011 
ITEM: HI LOAD SPRAY NOZZLES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  r .I [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3012 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3012 
ITEM: HI LOAD EVAPORATOR CORE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 1 / 1  ] [ I  E l  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 I N 1  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA 1/1 CRITICALITY. WORST CASE, THIS 
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR AND 
ONE FREON LOOP. AT THIS COOLING LEVEL, THE POWERDOWN 
REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTRY PLACE THE ORBITER AT A QUESTIONABLE 
SURVIVAL LIMIT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3013 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3013 
ITEM: HI LOAD VALVE MOUNTING PLATE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITY. WORST CASE, THIS FAILURE CAN 
IMMEDIATELY RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR. THIS 
MEANS ONLY ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE (THE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP) IS 
REQUIRED BEFORE THE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE CAN OCCUR. 
~ 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3014 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3014 
ITEM: HI LOAD VALVE MOUNTING PLATE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 1 / 1  ] [ I  E l  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  I N 1  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3015 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3015 
ITEM: HI LOAD VALVE MOUNTING PLATE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  ' [  1 
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ACCEPT NASA's RECOMMENDATION ON SCREEN B. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3016 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3016 
ITEM: HI LOAD EVAPORATOR ANTI-CARRYOVER DEVICE (ACOD) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] E l  C l  [ I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  1 1  C ' I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3017 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3017 
ITEM: HI LOAD EVAPORATOR ANTI-CARRYOVER DEVICE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C N I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3018 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-3-0311-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3018 
ITEM: HI LOAD ANTI-CARRYOVER DEVICE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
THE NASA FMEAS.DO NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN RESTRICTED FREON FLOW 
IN THE BODY OF THE EVAPORATOR AND RESTRICTED FREON FLOW IN PLACES 
SUCH AS THE ACOD. A RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE ACOD WILL HAVE 
NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON EVAPORATOR OPERATIONS AND 
THEREFORE SHOULD BE A 3/3 CRITICALITY. NASA SHOULD CONSIDER 
ADDING THIS FAILURE MODE FOR PURPOSES OF COMPLETION. DUE TO THE 
DIFFERENCES IN DIVISIONS, NO CRITICALITY IS BEING RECOMMENDED. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-178 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3019 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3019 
ITEM: HI LOAD EXIT DUCT 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW I 1 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  E N 3  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ X I  
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I' [ I  [ I  r I . .  r I. 
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3020 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0326-1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3020 
ITEM: HI LOAD EXIT DUCT 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ : I  [ N l  [ I  
I RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I .  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA RECOMMENDATION ON SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-180 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
4 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3021 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0326-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3021 
ITEM: HI LOAD INBOARD AND OUTBOARD DUCT HEATERS - ZONE 
A AND B 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE : 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
MONITOR 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT : 
12/18/87 
ATCS-3022 
06-3-0328-1 
ATCS 
3022 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
I 
I 
HI LOAD INBOARD AND OUTBOARD DUCT TEMPERATURE 
S . K .  SINCLAIR 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3023 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0326-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3023 
ITEM: HI LOAD INBOARD AND OUTBOARD DUCT HEATER 
THERMOSTATS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different' from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-183 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3024 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0326-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3024 
ITEM: HI LOAD INBOARD AND OUTBOARD .DUCT HEATER 
THERMOSTATS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N )  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) . 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] - 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA DETERMINED FAILED ON HEATERS TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. 
THE SAME EFFECTS ARE MANIFESTED BY A FAILED THERMOSTAT SUCH THAT 
THE THERMOSTAT IS REFLECTING A LOW TEMPERATURE AND THE HEATERS 
REMAIN ON. IOA WILL AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES IF 
THE FAILURE MODE IS CHANGED FROM A FAILED ON HEATER TO A FAILED 
OFF THERMOSTAT. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-184 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3025 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0314-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3025 
ITEM: HI LOAD NOZZLE HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
. . HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
FLIGHT RULES REQUIRE THAT THE HI LOAD NOZZLE REACH A GIVEN 
MINIMUM TEMPERATURE BEFORE THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR IS ENABLED. 
IF ALL HEATERS ARE INOPERATIVE, THIS MINIMUM TEMPERATURE CANNOT 
BE REACHED AND THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR MAY BE CONSIDERED 
UNAVAILABLE. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD PLUS LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP 
CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IOA 
RECOMMENDS THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-185 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3026 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0314-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3026 
ITEM: HI LOAD NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR/HEATER 
CONTROLLER ASSEMBLY 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] C N I  [ N l  C N I  c 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
FLIGHT RULES REQUIRE THE HI LOAD NOZZLE REACH A GIVEN MINIMUM 
TEMPERATURE PRIOR TO ENABLING THE HI LOAD EVAPORATOR. IF ALL 
HEATERS ARE INOPERATIVE, THE MINIMUM TEMPERATURE CANNOT BE 
REACHED AND THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR MUST BE CONSIDERED LOST. 
LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD PLUS LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP CAN RESULT IN 
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE IOA RECOMMENDS THE HIGHER 
CRITICALITIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-186 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3027 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0314-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3027 
ITEM: HI LOAD NOZZLE TEMPERATURE SENSOR/HEATER 
CONTROLLER ASSEMBLY 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
. FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N J [ N I  [ N I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: .(If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-187 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3028 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0328-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3028 
ITEM: HI LOAD DUCT NOZZLE TEMPERATURE MONITOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  c . I  
(ADD/DELETE ) . .  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-188 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3029 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0314-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3029 
ITEM: HI LOAD NOZZLE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA's RECOMMENDATION ON SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10\88 C-189 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3030 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3030 
ITEM: HI LOAD NOZZLE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA F'MEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-190 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3031 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-4 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3031 
ITEM: FES TOPPING FEEDLINE HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N M J [ X l  
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
1 I "  
[ I  
[ I  
[ / I  c I ,  [ 1 [ I  I 1  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA GROUPED ALL OF THE FEED WATER COMPONENTS INTO ONE FMEA 
GROUP. NO DISTINCTION WAS MADE BETWEEN "SHARED" COMPONENTS AND 
THOSE DEDICATED TO ONLY THE TOPPING OR HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR. 
UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-191 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3032 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS' 
MDAC ID: 3032 
ITEM: FES TOPPING FEEDLINE HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1 .  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONSIDERED A FAILED ON HEATER TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. 
THE SAME EFFECT IS ACHIEVED BY FAILING THE ASSOCIATED THERMOSTAT 
CLOSED - THEREBY FORCING THE HEATER TO REMAIN ON. IOA WILL AGREE 
IF THE NASA CRITICALITY IS CHANGED FROM A FAILED ON HEATER TO A 
. FAILED OFF THERMOSTAT. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-192 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3033 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3033 
ITEM: FES TOPPING FEEDLINE HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  c -1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
A FAILED OPEN THERMOSTAT HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS A FAILED OFF' 
HEATER. ADDITIONALLY, NASA MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN "SHARED" 
FEEDWATER COMPONENTS AND THOSE DEDICATED TO EITHER THE TOPPING OR 
HIGH LOAD EVAPORATORS. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, IOA AGREES 
WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-193 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3034 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0328-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3034 
ITEM: FES TOPPING FEEDLINE HEATER TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  c- 1 [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-194 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3035 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0323-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3035 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR WATER VALVE ASSEMBLY-40 
MICRON FILTER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N I C I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR WILL MEAN A PRIORITY MISSION. 
ONLY BY AN UNREALISTIC SEQUENCE OF FAILURES WILL THE LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE OCCUR. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R 
CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-195 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/18/87 
ATCS - 3 0 3 6 
06-3-0323-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
ATCS 
3036 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE 
S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] E l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
1 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE NORMAL POSITION FOR THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE IS 
"OPEN" WHENEVER THE EVAPORATOR IS ENABLED. IT IS REQUIRED TO 
CLOSE ONLY WHEN THE EVAPORATOR IS TURNED OFF (FOR PAYLOAD 
PURPOSES OR DURING THE LANDING SEQUENCE). SHOULD THIS BE 
REQUIRED, THE WORST CASE RESULT WILL BE THE LOSS OF MISSION NOT A 
LOSS OF C R E W  OR VEHICLE. A NON WORKING ISOLATION VALVE CAN BE 
MASKED BY A PROPERLY FUNCTIONING PULSER VALVE. THEREFORE, IOA 
DOES AGREE WITH THE NASA EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-196 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3037 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0323-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3037 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
r p 1  r NAI r p 1  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] r p 1  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
NASA [ 3 /1R ] 
COMPARE [: /N ] 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
~ r 3 /2R 1 C P I  r NAI [ P I  r 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR RESULTS ONLY IN A LOSS OF MISSION, 
NOT IN A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. AN UNREALISTIC CHAIN OF FAILURES 
IS REQUIRED TO REACH THE 1R CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IOA 
RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R RANKING. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-197 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3038 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0323-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3038 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR INTEGRAL PULSER/SHUTOFF 
VALVE/NOZ ZLE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N J I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
.-RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R CRITICALITY. LOSS OF THE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR RESULTS ONLY IN A LOSS OF MISSION, NOT A LOSS 
OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-198 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
i 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA F'MEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
VALVE/NOZ Z LE 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/18/87 
ATCS- 3 0 3 9 
06-3-0323-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
ATCS 
3039 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR INTEGRAL PULSER/SHUTOFF 
S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 1 1  [ I  1 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) . 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R RANKING. LOSS OF TOPPING 
EVAPORATOR ONLY RESULTS IN A LOSS OF MISSION, NOT IN A LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-199 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3040 
NASA FMEA W :  06-3-0327-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3040 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR INTEGRAL PULSER/SHUTOFF 
VALVE/NOZ Z L E  
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
C P I  I 1  IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  r NAI 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C I  C N I  C I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R CRITICALITY. LOSS OF TOPPING 
EVAPORATOR ONLY RESULTS IN A LOSS OF MISSION, NOT IN A LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE. IOA ACCEFTS NASA's EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-200 
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,I APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3041 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3041 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR FEEDLINE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [: NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN I@SHARED" FEEDWATER COMPONENTS 
AND THOSE DEDICATED TO EITHER THE TOPPING OR HIGH LOAD 
EVAPORATORS. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, IOA AGREES WITH NASA 
CRITICALITIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-201 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3042 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3042 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR FEEDLINE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN SHARED FEEDWATER COMPONENTS AND 
THOSE DEDICATED TO EITHER THE TOPPING OR HIGH LOAD EVAPORATORS. 
UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. IOA 
ALSO ACCEPTS NASA RECOMMENDATION ON SCREEN B. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3043 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW r 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3043 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-203 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3044 BASELINE [ 3 
NASA FMEA #: NEW 1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3044 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR INTEGRAL WLSER/SHUTOFF 
VALVE/NOZ ZLE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  r . 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3045 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3045 
ITEM: 
PLATE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR WATER VALVE/NOZZLE MOUNTING 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION 
REMARKS: 
NASA GROUPS ALL 
INTO ONE FMEA. 
THE LOSS OF ONE 
BEING EXAMINED, 
AND WITH NASA's 
1 [ I  C I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
FAILURES CAUSED BY A RESTRICTED FLOW OF FREON 
SINCE THE FAILURE IS EFFECTIVELY EQUIVALENT TO 
FREON LOOP REGARDLESS OF WHERE THE RESTRICTION IS 
IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITIES 
EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-205 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3046 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW ( X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3046 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR WATER VALVE/NOZZLE MOUNTING 
PLATE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 I N 1  C N I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE ( 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES WHICH RESULT IN A LEAKAGE OF FREON INTO 
THE FES CORE INTO ONE FMEA. IN THE CASE OF FREON LEAKING INTO 
THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR, WORST CASE RESULT (HARDWARE) IS A LOSS OF 
THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND ONE FREON LOOP. THIS IS A DEORBIT AT 
THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE CASE, BUT NOT AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE. IT TAKES ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE TO REACH THE 1R 
POINT. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 2/1R 
RANKING. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3047 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3047 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR WATER VALVE/NOZZLE MOUNTING 
PLATE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3048 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3048 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR CORE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES WHICH RESULT IN A LEAKAGE OF FREON INTO 
THE FES CORE INTO ONE FMEA. IN THE CASE OF FREON LEAKING INTO 
THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR, WORST CASE RESULT (HARDWARE) IS A LOSS OF 
THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND ONE FREON LOOP. THIS IS 
A DEORBIT AT THE NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE CASE, BUT NOT A LOSS 
OF CREW/VEHICLE. IT TAKES ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE TO REACH THE 1R 
POINT. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 2/1R RANKING. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3049 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0323-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3049 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR CORE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
[ N l  
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I' 
(ADD/DELETE 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR MEANS A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT - 
THEREFORE A LOSS OF MISSION AND A HARDWARE CRITICALITY OF "2" .  
HOWEVER, IT REQUIRES AN UNREALISTIC SEQUENCE OF FAILURES TO CAUSE 
A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF THE TOPPING 
EVAPORATOR. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 2/2 
CRITICALITY. 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3050 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-03 11-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3050 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR ANTI CARRYOVER DEVICE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.R. SINCLAIR 
AS SES SMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  E l  C l  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  I 1  * [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
C / 1  
* GIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA GROUPS ALL FMEAs INVOLVING A RESTRICTED FLOW OF FREON INTO 
ONE FAILURE. HOWEVER, WHEN THE RESTRICTION IS IN THE ACOD, THERE 
IS NO AFFECT ON THE EVAPORATOR OPERATION. ADDITIONALLY, THE 
FREON FLOW THROUGH THE ACOD IS ONLY A VERY SMALL PERCENTAGE 
OF THE FULL FREON LOOP FLOW. A RESTRICTION IN THE ACOD DOES NOT 
EQUATE TO A RESTRICTION IN THE FREON LOOP. IOA RECOMMENDS NASA 
SEPARATE THE VARIOUS FREON FLOW RESTRICTIONS INTO LOCATIONS AND 
ASSIGN THE ACOD RESTRICTION A 3/3 CRITICALITY. HOWEVER, 
DUE TO THIS DIFFERENCE IN DIVISIONS, NO RECOMMENDATIONS ARE BEING 
MODE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3051 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W C X I  
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3051 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR ANTI CARRYOVER DEVICE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  C NAI [ P I  C X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  I N 1  [ N l  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
C 2 /1R 1 [ P I  r NAI C P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES CAUSED BY A MIXING OF FREON AND WATER 
INTO ONE FMEA. WHEN THE MIXING OCCURS IN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR, 
THE RESULT IS A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP AND THE TOPPING 
EVAPORATOR. THIS IS STILL A SURVIVABLE ENTRY CONDITION 
AND ONLY AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF MISSION. ADDITIONAL FAILURES ARE 
REQUIRED TO REACH THE 1R CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS 
NASA SEPARATE THE FAILURES AND ASSIGN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR A 
2/1R CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3052 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3052 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR ANTI CARRYOVER DEVICE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N J [ N I  I N 3  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES CAUSED BY A MIXING OF FREON AND WATER 
INTO ONE FMEA. WHEN THE MIXING OCCURS IN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR, 
THE RESULT IS A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP AND THE TOPPING 
EVAPORATOR. THIS IS STILL A SURVIVABLE ENTRY CONDITION 
AND ONLY AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF MISSION. ADDITIONAL FAILURES ARE 
REQUIRED TO REACH THE 1R CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS 
NASA SEPARATE THE FAILURES AND ASSIGN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR A 
2/1R CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3053 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3053 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 C P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 E N 1  E N 1  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C 2 / 2  1 I 1  C l  C l  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
THE LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR RESULTS ONLY IN A LOSS OF 
THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE OCCURS. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS 
RETAINING THE 2/2 CRITICALITY. 
.MISSION. AN UNREALISTIC SEQUENCE OF FAILURES IS REQUIRED BEFORE 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-213 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3054 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW r 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3054 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD~DELETE) 
/ *  1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3055 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3055 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F, 
AND H HEATERS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /2R 1. [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA TREATS THE LOSS OF A SINGLE HEATER SYSTEM ON THE TOPPING 
EXIT DUCT IN THE SAME FMEA AS A BLOCKAGE OF THE EXIT DUCT. THE 
HEATERS ARE REDUNDANT, THEREFORE LOSS OF ONE DOES NOT RESULT IN A 
LOSS OF THE EXIT DUCT (AS DOES A SINGLE BLOCKAGE). 
LOSS OF ALL HEATER SYSTEMS MAY RESULT IN A LOSS OF THE TOPPING 
EVAPORATOR AND A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT. IT WILL NOT RESULT IN 
RETAINING THE 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA DOES ACCEPT NASA's 
EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
THE LOSS OF THE CREW OR VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-215 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3056 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3056 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F, 
AND H THERMOSTATS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  E l  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  1 1  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  I N 1  [ : I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONSIDERS A FAILED A HEATER TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. 
THE SAME EFFECT IS MANIFESTED WHEN A THERMOSTAT FAILS REFLECTING 
A LOW TEMPERATURE CAUSING THE HEATER TO BE CONTINUOUSLY POWERED. 
IOA WILL AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES IF THE FAILURE 
MODE IS CHANGED FROM A FAILED ON HEATER TO A FAILED OFF 
THERMOSTAT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3057 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3057 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F, 
AND H THERMOSTATS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT , ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] C P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  C N I  I 1  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from' NASA) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA TREATS THE LOSS OF A SINGLE HEATER SYSTEM ON THE TOPPING 
EXIT DUCT IN THE SAME FMEA AS A BLOCKAGE OF THE EXIT DUCT. THE 
HEATERS ARE REDUNDANT, THEREFORE LOSS OF ONE DOES NOT RESULT IN A 
LOSS OF THE EXIT DUCT (AS DOES A SINGLE BLOCKAGE). 
LOSS OF ALL HEATER SYSTEMS MAY RESULT IN A LOSS OF THE TOPPING 
EVAPORATOR AND A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT. IT WILL NOT RESULT IN 
THE LOSS OF THE CREW OR VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS 
RETAINING THE 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA DOES ACCEPT NASA's 
EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3058 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0328-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3058 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F, 
AND H TEMPERATURE MONITOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  E l  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  I 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,I I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3059 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3059 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT ZONE F AND H 
OVERTEMP THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONSIDERS FAILED ON HEATERS TO BE NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. THE 
SAME EFFECT IS ACHIEVED WHEN A THERMOSTAT FAILS OFF (REFLECTING A 
CONSISTENTLY LOW TEMPERATURE) AND FORCING THE HEATER TO BE 
CONTINUOUSLY POWERED. IOA WILL AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES 
IF THE FAILURE MODE IS CHANGED FROM A FAILED ON HEATER TO A 
FAILED OFF THERMOSTAT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3060 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0313-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3060 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH SONIC NOZZLES 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 2 / 2  1 [ I  I 1  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH ONE OF THE SONIC NOZZLES WILL RESULT IN 
THE LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR. THE LOSS OF THE TOPPING 
EVAPORATOR MEANS ONLY A LOSS OF MISSION, NOT A LOSS OF CREW OR 
VEHICLE. AN UNREALISTIC AND UNRELATED CHAIN OF FAILURES 
IS REQUIRED TO HAVE A LOSS OF A SONIC NOZZLE PROPAGATE INTO THE 
LOSS OF THE CREW OR VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 
CRITICALITY RANKING FOR THIS FAILURE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3061 
NASA FMEA 8 :  
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3061 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH SONIC NOZZLE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FIJNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r / i  1 '  1 c I '  [ 1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS. 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3062 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0313-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3062 
ITEM: .TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH NOZZLE HEATER 
ZONE G AND I 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  c 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS; (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF ALL NOZZLE HEATERS CAN RESULT IN A FREEZE UP IN THE 
NOZZLE. LOSS OF THE NOZZLE MEANS A LOSS OF THE TOPPING 
EVAPORATOR AND A MINIMUM DURATION MISSION. THEREFORE, IOA 
RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R CRITICAIJTY RANKING. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-222 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
m 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3063 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0313-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3063 
ITEEI: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH NOZZLE ZONE G AND 
I HEATER CONTROLLERS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] C N I  I N 1  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE ( ] 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF THE HEATER CONTROLLER MEANS LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED 
HEATER. LOSS OF ALL NOZZLE HEATERS CAN LEAD TO A FREEZE UP IN 
THE NOZZLE, LOSS OF THE NOZZLE, AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR MEANS A 
MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 
3/2R CRITICALITY RATING. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3064 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0327-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3064 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH NOZZLE ZONE G AND 
I HEATER CONTROLLERS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  C N I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONSIDERS A FAILED ON HEATER TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. 
THE SAME EFFECT IS ACHIEVED BY FAILING A THERMOSTAT REFLECTING A 
LOW TEMPERATURE. IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES IF THE 
FAILURE MODE IS CHANGED FROM THE FAILED ON HEATER TO A FAILED 
OFF THERMOSTAT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3065 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0328-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3065 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH NOZZLE 
TEMPERATURE MONITORS - ZONES G AND I 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B .  C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] E l  C I  [ I  [ I  
. RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
/ 1 1 I I 1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3066 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3066 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE A/B FROM WATER SUPPLY TO 
VALVE/WATER NOZZLE ASSEMBLIES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE C / 3 C I  C N I  C I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
/ I  [ I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
I ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3067 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-1 
I NASA DATA: BASELINE ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3067 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE A/B FROM WATER SUPPLY TO 
WATER/VALVE NOZZLE ASSEMBLIES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
I 
i 
1 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA 3 /1R ] E P I  [ P I  [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] E P I  c NAI [ P I  [ X I  
[ I  E N 1  [ I  E N 1  COMPARE [ N / ] 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 
[ / I  E l  E l  [ I  E l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
I 
REMARKS: 
INSUFFICIENT DATA TO RESOLVE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3068 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3068 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE HEATERS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3069 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3069 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE FORWARD HEATER THERMOSTATS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] 1 1  [ I  E l  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONSIDERS A FAILED ON HEATER TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. 
THE SAME EFFECT IS ACHIEVED BY FAILING THE THERMOSTAT SUCH THAT A 
L O W  TEMPERATURE IS ALWAYS REFLECTED AND THE HEATER IS 
CONTINUOUSLY POWERED. IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITIES IF THE 
FAILURE MODE IS CHANGED FROM A FAILED ON HEATER TO A FAILED OFF 
THERMOSTAT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/31/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3069A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2351-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3069 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE FORWARD HEATER THERMOSTATS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E l  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  C l  1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3070 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3070 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE FORWARD HEATER THERMOSTATS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  e 1  
COMPARE [ / ] e 1  [ I  [ I  e 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3071 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-3-0328-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3071 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] E l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  I 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ 1 -  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3072 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-4 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3072 
ITEM: FES ACCUMULATOR HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r ' I *  
[ I  
r 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  r 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3073 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3073 
ITEM: FES ACCUMULATOR HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3074 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-5 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3074 
ITEM: FES ACCUMULATOR HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] E l  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  I N 1  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  4 1 E l  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONSIDERS A FAILED ON HEATER TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. 
THE SAME EFFECT IS ACHIEVED WHEN A THERMOSTAT FAILS OFF 
(REFLECTING A LOW TEMPERATURE) AND KEEPS CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE 
HEATER. IOA WILL AGREE WITH THE NASA CRITICALITIES IF THE 
FAILURE MODE IF CHANGED FROM A FAILED ON HEATER TO A FAILED OFF 
THERMOSTAT. 
~ 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3075 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0328-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W I X l  
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3075 
ITEM: FES ACCUMULATOR TEMPERATURE MONITOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  E l  [ I  I 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3076 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2095-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3076 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR STATUS MONITOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  I [ I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEA IS ACTUALLY WRITTEN AGAINST THE RESISTOR IN THE STATUS 
MONITORING CIRCUIT RATHER THAN THE MONITOR ITSELF. 
SINCE IT IS ONLY A MONITOR CIRCUIT, IOA FEELS THE 3/3 CRITICALITY 
IS A MORE REALISTIC RANKING. 
HOWEVER, 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3076A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3076 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR STATUS MONITOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
ONLY RESULT IS A LOSS OF STATUS - NOT A LOSS OF FUNCTION. 
THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICALITY RANKING. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-238 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3077 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-6 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3077 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA's EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-239 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3078 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3078 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: . (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  1 3  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA's EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-240 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3079 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2028-3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3079 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  C NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  C l  [ I  
C N I  [ N l  C N I  COMPARE [ N /N ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
C I *  
C X I  
C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
2 /1R I C P I  C NAI C P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATE THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROLLER SWITCHES 
INTO TWO FMEAS. IOA GROUPED THEM TOGETHER. THE NASA CRITICALITY 
OF 3/1R DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE AUTOMATIC LOSS OF MISSION FOR THE 
LOSS OF AN EVAPORATOR. THE LOSS.OF EITHER EVAPORATOR 
IS CAUSED BY THE EVAPORATOR COMING ON TOO EARLY DURING ASCENT AND 
DAMAGING THE CORE. IF THE HIGH LOAD IS THE ONE FAILED, ONLY ONE 
ADDITIONAL FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE 
CAN OCCUR. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-241 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3079A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2030-3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3079 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
I 
I 
I 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATE THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROLLER SWITCHES 
INTO TWO FMEAs. IOA GROUPED THEM TOGETHER. THE 3/3 CRITICALITY 
DOES NOT CONSIDER THE EFFECTS OF THE EVAPORATOR OPERATING TOO 
SOON AND DAMAGING THE CORE DURING LAUNCH. LOSS OF THE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR IS A LOSS OF MISSION; LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD 
CAN LEAD TO A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, TAKING THE WORST 
CASE EFFECTS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR FAILING ON DURING ASCENT 
AND FREEZING THE CORE, IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/1R CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-242 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3080 
NASA FMEA #: 05-61-2028-1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3080 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  E l  r 
REC.OMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  c 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
1 
1 
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
EQU-TE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATE THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROLLER 
SWITCHES. IOA COMBINED THEM. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-243 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-308OA 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2030-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3080 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] E l  [ N I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALF: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATE THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROLLER 
SWITCHES. IOA COMBINED THEM INTO ONE FMEA. IOA AGREES WITH NASA 
RECOMMENDATION ON SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-244 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3081 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2028-2 
'NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3081 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  r I "  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAS SEPARATE THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROLLER 
SWITCHES. IOA COMBINED THEM INTO ONE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-245 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3081A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-61-2030-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3081 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  J [ I  E l  E l  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATE THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTROLLER 
SWITCHES. IOA COMBINED THEM INTO ONE F'MEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT 
SECONDARY CONTROLLER SWITCH RECEIVE THE SAME CRITICALITY AS THE 
THE PRIMARY SWITCH UNDER GROUNDRULES SET FORTH IN 22206. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-246 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3082 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2090-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3082 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER SWITCH STATUS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N I  C N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEA WRITTEN AGAINST RESISTORS IN STATUS MONITORING CIRCUITS 
AND GPC CONTROL CIRCUIT. NASA SHOULD CONSIDER DIVIDING THE ONE 
FMEA INTO 2 SEPARATE FMEAs FOR BETTER DELENIATION AND RESOLUTION. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-247 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3083 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2251-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3083 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER INPUT DIODES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  E NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E l  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-248 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3083A BASELINE [ 3 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2253-1 NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3083 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER INPUT DIODES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-249 
INADEQUATE [ J 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3084 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2077-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3084 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER INPUT RESISTORS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] I REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-250 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3085 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-61-2090-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3085 
ITEM: FES CONTROL SWITCH INPUT RESISTORS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  E 1 ,  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-251 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3085A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2091-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W C X I  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3085 
ITEM: FES CONTROL SWITCH INPUT RESISTORS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E l  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different froln NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  * [  1 
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA SEPARATED FMEAs FOR llON1l AND I1GPCV1 INPUT RESISTORS. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-252 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3086 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW r 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3086 
ITEM: FES CONTROL SWITCH INPUT RESISTORS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA c / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
DELETE - NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-253 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3087 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2207-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3087 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER POWER APPLICATION COMPONENTS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  I : ]  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-254 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3088 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2031-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3088 
ITEM: HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ F l  [ X I  
COMPARE ( / ] [ I  [ I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1  [ - 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA's EVALUATION OF SCREEN C. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-255 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3089 
NASA FMEA t: 05-6W-2031-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3089 
ITEM: HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  I NAI C F I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  E N 1  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-256 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3090 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3090 
ITEM: HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH STATUS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA r / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-257 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3091 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0315-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
= [ X I  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3091 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER POWER SUPPLY 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE ( / ] [ I  [ N I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA's EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-258 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3092 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0318-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3092 
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER MIDPOINT TEMPERATURE 
SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT . ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 1 '  [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-259 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3093 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0318-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3093 
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER MIDPOINT TEMPERATURE 
SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C l  C l  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
C l  
[ / I  ' [  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3094 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0318-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3094 
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER MIDPOINT TEMPERATURE 
SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3095 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0318-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3095 
ITEM: FES SECONDARY CONTROLLER MIDPOINT TEMPERATURE 
SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C I  C I  C I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS .: 
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR ONLY RESULTS IN A LOSS OF MISSION - NOT IN A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, RECOMMEND RETAINING 
THE 3/2R CRITICALITY RATING. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-262 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3096 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0318-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3096 
ITEM: FES SECONDARY CONTROLLER MIDPOINT TEMPERATURE 
SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT, ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOmNDATIONS: (If dif,ferent from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR RESULTS IN A LOSS OF MISSION - NOT 
IN A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. IOA RECOMMENDS THE 3/2R CRITICALITY 
RANKING BE RETAINED. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-263 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3097 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0319-01 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW 1 X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3097 
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER EVAPORATOR OUT 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
, FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E 3  
COMPARE C / ] C I  C I  c 1  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: . (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  C l  C l  I 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATE THE TEMPERATURE SENSORS FOR THE PRIMARY A AND 
PRIMARY B CONTROLLERS. IOA GROUPED THESE SENSORS INTO ONE FMEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3097A 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-3-0319-04 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3097 
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER EVAPORATOR OUT 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA F'MEAs SEPARATE THE TEMPERATURE SENSORS FOR THE PRIMARY A AND 
PRIMARY B CONTROLLERS. IOA GROUPED THESE SENSORS INTO ONE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-265 I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3098 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0319-01 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W C X l  
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3098 
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER EVAPORATOR OUT 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . X .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 C I  C I  C I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA F'MEAs SEPARATE THE TEMPERATURE SENSORS FOR THE PRIMARY A AND 
PRIMARY B CONTROLLERS. IOA GROUPED THESE SENSORS INTO ONE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-266 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3098A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0319-04 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3098 
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER EVAPORATOR OUT 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B . c  
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [: I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
' RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  r I '  c 1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATE THE TEMPERATURE SENSORS FOR THE PRIMARY A AND 
PRIMARY B CONTROLLERS. IOA GROUPED THESE SENSORS INTO ONE FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-267 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3099 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-03 19-07 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3099 
ITEM: FES SECONDAR! 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
CONTRO 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LER EVAPORATOR OUT 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A ' B  C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3100 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0319-07 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3100 
ITEM: FES SECONDARY CONTROLLER EVAPORATOR OUT 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.R. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-269 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3101 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0319-10 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3101 
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
. HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
I COMPARE [ / ] c 3  [ I  c 3  1 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAs SPLIT THE PRIMARY A AND PRIMARY B SENSORS. IOA 
GROUPED THESE TOGETHER. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-270 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3101A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0319-13 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3101 
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1 1 1 1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAs SPLIT THE PRIMARY A AND PRIMARY B SENSORS. IOA 
GROUPED THESE TOGETHER. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-271 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3102 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-03 19-10 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3102 
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA FMEAs SPLIT THE PRIMARY A AND PRIMARY B SENSOR FMEAs. IOA 
GROUPED THEM TOGETHER. THE FAILURE RESULTS IN A LOSS OF THE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR WHICH IS A LOSS OF MISSION, BUT NOT A LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE. IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R CRITICALITY 
RANKING. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-272 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3102A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0319-13 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3102 
ITEM: FES PRIMARY CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC 
TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA FNEAs SPLIT THE PRIMARY A AND PRIMARY B SENSOR FMEAs. IOA 
GROUPED THEM TOGETHER. THE FAILURE RESULTS IN A LOSS OF THE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR WHICH IS A LOSS OF MISSION, BUT NOT A LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE. IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R CRITICALITY 
RANKING . 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3103 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0315-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3103 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  [ 
* 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  C I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA's EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-274 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3104 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0315-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3104 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER SHUTDOWN LOGIC 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3105 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0322-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3105 
ITEM: HI-LOAD VALVE PULSER ELECTRONICS (PRIMARY A, B, 
AND SECONDARY) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) . 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA INCLUDES THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE MECHANICAL FMEAs RATHER 
THAN EPD&C. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1 
I 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3106 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0322-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3106 
ITEM: HI-LOAD VALVE PULSER ELECTRONICS (PRIMARY A, B, 
AND SECONDARY) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from-NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA ASSESSMENT OF SCREEN B DUE TO LACK OF 
CONFLICTING DATA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3107 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0322-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3107 
ITEM: HI-LOAD ISOLATION VALVE RELAY (PRIMARY A, B, AND 
SECONDARY) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FVNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 C I  C l  [ I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3108 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0322-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3108 
ITEM: HI-LOAD SPRAY VALVE RELAY (PRIMARY A, B, AND 
SECONDARY) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I: I "  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: . (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  I 1  E l  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3109 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0323-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3109 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE/HOLDING C I 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR IS A LOSS OF MISSION, NOT A LOSS 
OF CREW/VEHICLE. IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R CRITICALITY 
RANKING. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3110 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0323-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3110 
ITEM: TOPPING EXAPORATOR SPRAY VALVE RELAY 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TOPPING EVAPORATOR WHICH IS ONLY A 
LOSS OF MISSION, NOT A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. IOA RECOMMENDS THE 
LOWER CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3111 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3111 
ITEM: GROUND OPERATIONS DIAGNOSTIC MEASUREMENTS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
[ I *  
[ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. SHOULD BE ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3112 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2039-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3112 
ITEM: FES SECONDARY SUPPLY SELECT SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  I N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3113 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2039-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3113 
ITEM: FES SECONDARY SUPPLY SELECT SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C NAI [ P I  C I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  C l  C l  
COMPARE [ /N ] C N I  [ N l  C N I  [ : I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  C l  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WOMSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3114 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2049-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3114 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE HEATER SELECT SWITCH 
LEAD, ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-285 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3115 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2049-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3115 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE HE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
TER SELECT SWITCH 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] E N 1  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  E 3  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3116 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2096-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3116 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE HEATER SWITCH STATUS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  C I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] 1 1  [ I  [ I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEA IS WRITTEN AGAINST THE RESISTOR IN THE STATUS 
MONITORING CIRCUIT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3117 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2023-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3117 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE HEATER FUSES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  C I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3118 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2052-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3118 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER SELECT SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 1 3  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR IS A LOSS OF MISSION, NOT A LOSS 
OF CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 2/2 . 
CRITS . 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-289 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT : 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/22/87 
ATCS-3119 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
ATCS 
3119 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER SELECT SWITCH 
S . K .  SINCLAIR 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
I 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA DEEMED THIS TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE. (05-6W-2052- 
2) IOA FEELS THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3120 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2092-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3120 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER SELECT SWITCH STATUS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
E l  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEA WRITTEN AGAINST RESISTOR IN STATUS MONITORING CI.RCUIT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3121 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2022-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3121 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER SELECT SWITCH FUSES 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR IS A LOSS OF MISSION, NOT A LOSS 
OF CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R 
CRITICALITY RANKING. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT : 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/ 3 0/87 
ATCS-3122 
05-6W-2176-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
ATCS 
3122 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER FUSES/RPCS 
S.K. SINCLAIR 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE RESULT OF THIS FAILURE IS A LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
AND A LOSS OF MISSION, BUT NOT A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/2R CRITICALITY RANKING. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3123 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2128-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3123 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER RELAY 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  c NAI I p.1 
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
THE LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR MAY RESULT IN A LOSS OF 
MISSION BUT WILL NOT.RESULT IN A LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. IOA 
RECOMMENDS THE 3/2R CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3124 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2047-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3124 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR NOZZLE HEATER SELECT SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] 1 1  [ I  [ I  c I "  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REms : 
NON-OPERATION OF THE NOZZLE HEATER CAN LEAD TO A FREEZE UP AND A 
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR. IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 
3/2R CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3125 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2094-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3125 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR NOZZLE HEATER SELECT SWITCH 
STATUS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA FMEA IS ACTUALLY WRITTEN AGAINST THE RESISTOR IN THE 
STATUSING CIRCUIT AS OPPOSED TO THE STATUS MONITOR. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3126 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2047-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3126 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR NOZZLE HEATER SELECT SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  C I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELkTE ) 
[ / I .  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-297 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/31/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3127 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2022-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3 127 
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR NOZZLE HEATER FUSES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR IS A LOSS OF MISSION, NOT A LOSS 
OF CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 3/2R 
CRITICALITY RANKING. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3128 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2053-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3128 
ITEM: HI-LOAD HEATER SELECT SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B - c  
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA's EVALUATION OF SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-299 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3129 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3129 
ITEM: HI-LOAD HEATER SELECT SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A - B  C 
COMPARE [ N /N J [ I  I 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  ' [  1 
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
NASA DEEMED THIS TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (05-6W-2053- 
2). IOA FEELS THAT THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-300 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3130 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2093-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3130 
ITEM: HI-LOAD DUCT HEATER SWITCH STATUS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B c .  
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
l' 1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  ! I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEA WRITTEN AGAINST RESISTORS IN STATUS CIRCUIT. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-301 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3131 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2020-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3131 
ITEM: HI-LOAD DUCT HEATER SWITCH FUSES 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B .  C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 C P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I '  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
1 .  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-302 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3132 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2181-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3132 
ITEM: HI-LOAD DUCT HEATER F'USES/RPCS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
. . HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] E l  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ '  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-303 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3132A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2181-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3132 
ITEM: HI-LOAD DUCT HEATER FUSES/RPCS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ [ I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / .I [ I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ORIGINALLY COMBINED THE TWO FAILURE MODES OF FAILING OPEN AND 
PREMATURE OPERATION. NASA's SEPARATION ALLOWS BETTER DISTINCTION 
OF CRITICALITIES FOR EACH FAILURE MODE. IOA AGREES WITH NASA 
CRITICALITIES. 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3133 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2133-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 3133 
ITEM: HI-LOAD DUCT HEATER RELAYS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  [ I  t l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-305 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4001 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0413-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4001 
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE ("3) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADDIDELETE ) 
[ / I  I' 1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R. THEREFORE 
IOA AND NASA CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH NO ISSUES ON 
SCREEN B e  
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-306 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4002 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0413-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4002 
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 E l  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R. THEREFORE 
IOA AND NASA CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH NO ISSUES ON 
SCREEN B. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-307 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4003 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0406-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4003 
ITEM: PRESSURE TRANSDUCER ("3 TANK) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA 3 /3 ] E l  [ I  E l  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  E l  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
I 
1 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 1 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-308 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4004 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0407-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4004 
ITEM: TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER ("3 TANK) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C l  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ 1 .  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-309 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4005 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0411-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS ' 
MDAC ID: 4005 
ITEM: AMMONIA CONTROLLER A 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
I 
1 
I 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  . [  1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R, MAKING IOA 
AND NASA IN AGREEMENT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4006 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0411-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4006 
ITEM: AMMONIA CONTROLLER A 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 1 / 1  1 [ I  [ I  [ -  1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY ALLOWS 
THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R. HOWEVER, 
PREMATURE OPERATION OF THE CONTROLLER WILL ALLOW AMMONIA TO REACH 
THE BOILER AND EXCESSIVELY COOL THE FREON LOOP WHICH MAY CAUSE 
THE WATER LOOPS TO FREEZE AND RUPTURE. TO BE CONSISTENT WITH 
OTHER NASA CRITICALITIES, THIS FMEA NEEDS TO BE A I ' 1 / l 1 ' .  
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-311 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4007 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0410-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4007 
ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
c 2 /1R 1 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R. 
ADDITIONALLY, EACH VALVE HAS ONE CONTROLLER WHICH CAN CAUSE 
PREMATURE CLOSING. PREMATURE CLOSING WILL PREVENT OPERATION OF 
ONE ABS. LOSS OF BOTH ABSs CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS RETAINING THE 2/1R CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-312 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4008 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0410-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4008 
ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N. 0. ) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
r 3 /1R 1 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
BEFORE THIS FAILURE IS MANIFESTED, BOTH CONTROL VALVES MUST FAIL 
TO CLOSE AND THE ISOLATION VALVE MUST FAIL OPEN. THESE THREE 
FAILURES COULD INTRODUCE AMMONIA INTO THE BOILER EARLY AND CAUSE 
EXCESSIVE COOLING OF THE FREON LOOP. A SUPER-COOLED FREON 
LOOP COULD CAUSE THE WATER LOOP TO FREEZE AND RUPTURE WITH A 
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE COOLING. THEREFORE, IOA IS 
RECOMMENDING A CRITICALITY RANKING OF 3/1R. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-313 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4009 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4009 
ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE ( N . O . )  
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW 1 1 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
ADD/DELETE 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-314 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4010 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-3-0403-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4010 
ITEM: TEMERATURE SENSOR ("3 CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from .NASA) 
E A 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
- [  / I [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATED THE TWO FAILURE MODES (FAILED HIGH AND 
FAILED LOW) AND SEPARATED THE TWO TEMPERATURE SENSORS USED FOR 
THE CONTROLLER FROM THE ONE USED FOR THE FAULT DETECTION LOGIC 
RESULTING IN FOUR FMEAS WHERE I O A  HAD ONE. THESE TEMPERATURE 
SENSORS CONTROL ELECTRONICS WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECT THE OPERATION 
OF THE ABS. FAILURES CAN LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE ABS AND 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IOA AGREES WITH 
NASA CRITICALTIES. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-315 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4010A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0403-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4010 
ITEM: TEMERATURE SENSOR ("3 CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARXS: 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATED THE TWO FAILURE MODES (FAILED HIGH AND 
FAILED LOW) AND SEPARATED THE TWO TEMPERATURE SENSORS USED FOR 
THE CONTROLLER FROM THE ONE USED FOR THE FAULT DETECTION LOGIC 
RESULTING IN FOUR FMEAs WHERE IOA HAD ONE. THESE TEMPERATURE 
SENSORS CONTROL ELECTRONICS WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECT THE OPERATION 
OF THE ABS. FAILURES CAN LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE ABS AND 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IOA AGREES WITH 
NASA CRITICALTIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-316 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
~I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4010B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0404-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4010 
ITEM: TEMERATURE SENSOR ("3 CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATED THE TWO FAILURE MODES (FAILED HIGH AND 
FAILED LOW) AND SEPARATED THE TWO TEMPERATURE SENSORS USED FOR 
THE CONTROLLER FROM THE ONE USED FOR THE FAULT DETECTION LOGIC 
RESULTING IN FOUR FMEAs WHERE IOA HAD ONE. THESE TEMPERATURE 
SENSORS CONTROL ELECTRONICS WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECT THE OPERATION 
OF THE ABS. FAILURES CAN LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE ABS AND 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IOA AGREES WITH 
NASA CRITICALTIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-317 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 5- 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-401OC 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0404-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4010 
ITEM: TEMERATURE SENSOR ("3 CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I "  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA FMEAs SEPARATED THE TWO FAILURE MODES (FAILED HIGH AND 
FAILED L O W )  AND SEPARATED THE TWO TEMPERATURE SENSORS USED FOR 
THE CONTROLLER FROM THE ONE USED FOR THE FAULT DETECTION LOGIC 
RESULTING IN FOUR FMEAs WHERE IOA HAD ONE. THESE TEMPERATURE 
SENSORS CONTROL ELECTRONICS WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECT THE OPERATION 
OF THE ABS. FAILURES CAN LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE ABS AND 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, IOA AGREES WITH 
NASA CRITICALTIES. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4011 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0408-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4011 
ITEM: TANK ISOLATION VALVE (N.C.) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R PUTTING NASA 
AND IOA IN AGREEMENT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4012 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0408-4 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4012 
ITEM: TANK ISOLATION VALVE (N.C.) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 1 / 1  1 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
I * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R. HOWEVER, 
THE VALVE FAILING OPEN IS A WORST CASE CONDITION OF INTERNAL 
LEAKAGE THROUGH THE VALVE. SINCE NASA HAS DETERMINED THE 
CASE OF INTERNAL LEAKAGE TO BE A 1/1 CRITICALITY (DUE TO 
EXCESSIVE COOLING OF THE FREON LOOP, SUBSEQUENT COOLING OF THE 
VALVE FAILING OPEN MUST ALSO HAVE A 1/1 CRITICALITY. 
WATER LOOP, WITH FREEZING AND RUPTURE): THE CASE OF THE ISOLATION 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-320 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4013 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0401-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4013 
ITEM: NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4014 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4014 
ITEM: NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER 
I LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NO EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-322 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4015 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0416-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4015 
ITEM: TANK DISCONNECTS, LINES AND FITTINGS (RELIEF 
VALVE TO ISOLATION VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  [ I  ~ 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) ~ 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R PUTTING IOA 
AND NASA IN AGREEMENT. (IOA AGREES WITH SCREEN B.) 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4015A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0414-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4015 
ITEM: TANK DISCONNECTS, LINES AND FITTINGS (RELIEF 
VALVE TO ISOLATION VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  C N I  [ : I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
. (ADD/DELETE) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R PUTTING IOA 
AND NASA IN AGREEMENT. (IOA AGREES WITH NASA's SCREEN B 
RECOMMENDATION.) 
i 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4016 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0416-2 
I NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4016 
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS (ISOLATION VALVE TO BOILER) 
I LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
I ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
I IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
1 RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
I 
I 
i 
I 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 1/1 PUTTING IOA 
AND NASA IN AGREEMENT. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-325 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/31/87 
NASA F'MEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4017 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW 1 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4017 
ITEM: LINES (BOILER TO DISCHARGE VENT) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NO DISCERNIBLY EQUIVALENT NASA F'MEA. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
I 
I 
I 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4018 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0420-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4018 
ITEM: TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER ("3 EXHAUST) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J E l  [ I  [ I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  L: 3 .  
(ADD/DELETE) 
I 
I 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4019 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2078-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4019 
ITEM: RESISTOR ("3 CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P  E 
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  * [  1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE 
ABS CONTROLLER. LOSS OF ALL CONTROL CAPABILITIES MEANS LOSS OF 
ONE ABS WITH SECOND ABS LOSS MEANING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4020 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4020 
ITEM: RESISTOR ("3 CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMAFUZS: 
DELETE - NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/31/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4021 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2026-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4021 
ITEM: SWITCH 42 ("3 CONTROUER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  I N 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSISl FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R PUTTING IOA 
AND NASA IN AGREEMENT. (IOA AGREES WITH NASA's EVALUATION OF 
SCREEN B.) 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/31/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4021A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2026-3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4021 
ITEM: SWITCH 42 ("3 CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  E P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P I  C NAI C P I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  E N 1  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD~DELETE) ' 
C / l  C .  1 C l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS F'MEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R PUTTING IOA 
AND NASA IN AGREEMENT. (IOA AGREES WITH NASA's EVALUATION OF 
SCREEN B.) 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/31/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4022 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2026-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4022 
ITEM: SWITCH 42 ("3 CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I / *I [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
DURING THE IOA ANALYSIS, FAILURES WERE CONSIDERED FOR THE NOMINAL 
MISSION PROFILE AND DURING ABORTS. THE IOA ANALYSIS OF THE 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES DURING THE 
ABORT REGIONS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ONLY 
ALLOWS THE ENTRY OF NOMINAL FLIGHT CRITICALITIES. THE HIGHEST 
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FMEA WAS ACTUALLY 2/1R PUTTING IOA 
AND NASA IN AGREEMENT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4023 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2079-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4023 
ITEM: RESISTOR ("3 FEEDBACK) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  E l  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4024 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW 1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4024 
ITEM: RESISTOR ("3 FEEDBACK) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DELETE - NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4025 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2255-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4025 
ITEM: DIODES (GPC) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 1 .  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY. LOSS OF DIODE CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF 
CONTROL CAPABILITY OF THE ABS WITH SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THE ABS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4026 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2255-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4026 
ITEM: DIODES (GPC) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] E l  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4027 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2201-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4027 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (POWER-PRI/GPC) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N I  C N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 1 / 1  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
PREMATURE OPENING OF ISOLATION VALVE SHOULD BE GIVEN A 1/1 
CRITICALITY TO BE CONSISTENT WITH OTHER FAILURES OF THIS TYPE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4028 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2201-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 4028 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER ("3 CONTROLLER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  C I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. FAILURE OF HYBRID DRIVER CAN 
EVENTUALLY LEAD TO LOSS OF ABS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1111OX 
NASA F'MEA #: 06-3-0108-1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11110 
ITEM: CHECK VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. THIS 
FAILURE MODE WAS NOT CONSIDERED DURING THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS 
PROCESS. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11111X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0207-3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11111 
ITEM: FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  C A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. THIS 
FAILURE MODE WAS NOT CONSIDERED DURING THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS 
PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11112X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0212-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11112 
ITEM: SERVICING QUICK DISCONNECT CAP 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R J C F I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
1 1 1  [ I  c I , [  1 C A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. IOA 
GROUNDRULES HAD-CONSIDERED ALL COMPONENTS OF THE QUICK 
DISCONNECTS TO BE ONE ITEM, THUS ELIMINATING THE "INTERNAL 
LEAKAGE" FAILURE MODE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11113X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0223-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11113 
ITEM: PAYLAOD HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 1 [ I  1 1  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  1 : 1 ' [ 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. THIS 
FAILURE.MODE WAS NOT CONSIDERED ON THIS EQUIPMENT DURING THE 
ORIGINAL ANALYSIS PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11114X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0303-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11114 
ITEM: TEMPERATURE SENSOR, FCL EVAP OUT TEMP 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  I 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. IOA 
FEELS THE LOSS OF A SENSOR IS MORE ACCURATELY 
RATHER THAN HAVING MISSION IMPACT. THIS ITEM 
THE DIVISION BETWEEN FREON COOLANT LOOP FMEAs 
EVAPORATOR l?MEAs. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-343 
REFLECTED AS A 3/3 
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AND 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11115X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0304-4 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11115 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2  ] [ I  [ I  r 
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X  
r 
* 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. SINCE 
FAILURE AFFECTS GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY AND HAS NO AFFECT ON ON- 
ORBIT OPERATIONS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE 3/3 CRITICALITY RANKING. 
THE FAILURE OCCURS ONLY DURING GROUND OPERATIONS AND WAS 
NOT CONSIDERED DURING THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS PROCESS. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE : 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT : 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1/ 06/88 
ATCS-11116X 
06-3-0305-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
N E W [ X I  
ATCS 
11116 
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER, FLUID CONNECTOR 
S . K .  SINCIAIR 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N J [ I  1 3  I 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
[ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
r 3 / 3  I [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. WORST 
CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY WHICH IS A 3/3 CRITICALITY BY 
22206. IOA THEREFORE DISAGREES WITH NASA's RECOMMENDATION. 
ALSO, THE FAILURE MODE WAS NOT CONSIDERED DURING THE ORIGINAL 
ANALYSIS BECAUSE IT OCCURS ONLY DURING GROUND OPERATIONS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11117X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0305-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11117 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER, FLUID CONNECTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 3  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS, IOA 
TREATED ALL PARTS OF QUICK DISCONNECTS AS A SINGLE ITEM. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11118X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0305-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11118 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER, FLUID CONNECTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  E l  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. SINCE I 
WORST CASE EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY, IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/3 
CRITICALITY. THE FAILURE MODE WAS NOT CONSIDERED DURING THE 
ORIGINAL ANALYSIS SINCE IT AFFECTS ONLY GROUND OPERATIONS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
. ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11119X 
NASA F'MEA' #: 05-6W-2004-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11119 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKERS (FREON PUMP) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  C I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE ( / ] [ I  C l  [ I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE ( 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. IOA 
CONSIDERED THE CASE OF ATTEMPTING TO OPEN A CIRCUIT BREAKER 
MANUALLY AS AN OFF-NOMINAL OPERATION. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE OF 
THIS ACTION WAS NOT ADDRESSED DURING THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS 
PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1112OX 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2008-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11120 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER (FREON FLOW PROPORTIONING) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] 1 1  [ I  [ I  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  1 3  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. IOA 
CONSIDERED THE CASE OF ATTEMPTING TO OPEN A CIRCUIT BREAKER 
MANUALLY AS 
THIS ACTION 
PROCESS. 
AN OFF-NOMINAL OPERATION. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE OF 
WAS NOT ADDRESSED DURING THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11121X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2041-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11121 
ITEM: SW10, 11 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B c . .  
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  I [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. SINCE 
ONLY SENSOR DATA IS LOST, IOA FEELS A LOWER CRITICALITY IS MORE 
REALISTIC. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11122X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2131-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11122 
ITEM: FREON PUMP RELAY 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  1 1  I 1  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  I 1  [ I  1 1  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
DURING THE 
COMPONENTS 
RESTRICTED 
ANALYSIS PHASE, RESTRICTED FREON FLOW WITHIN VARIOUS 
WAS CONSIDERED, BUT NOT A GENERIC, OVERALL CASE OF 
FLOW THROUGH THE FREON LOOP LINES AND FITTINGS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11123X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0390-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11123 
ITEM: FREON LOOP LINES AND FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
DURING THE ANALYSIS PHASE, RESTRICTED FREON FLOW WITHIN VARIOUS 
COMPONENTS WAS CONSIDERED, BUT NOT A GENERIC, OVERALL CASE OF 
RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE FREON LOOP LINES AND FITTINGS. 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1/ 08/8 8 
ATCS-1204OX 
05-6W-2010-4 
ATCS 
12040 
CIRCUIT BREAKER 14 (FREON 
S . R .  SINCLAIR 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
RADIATOR CONTROLLER) 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC . . A  B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ l . I  1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. IOA 
CONSIDERED THE MANUAL OPENING OF A CIRCUIT BREAKER AS AN OFF- 
NOMINAL OPERATION AND THEREFORE D I D  NOT ANALYZE THE POSSIBILITY 
OF IT FAILING TO OPEN. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-12041X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2014-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 12041 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER (RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I . [ ]  [ I  C I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. IOA 
CONSIDERED THE MANUAL OPENING OF A CIRCUIT BREAKER AS AN OFF- 
NOMINAL OPERATION AND THEREFORE DID NOT ANALYZE THE POSSIBILITY 
OF IT FAILING TO OPEN. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-354 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-12042X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2036-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 12042 
ITEM: SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] C l  I 1  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  C l  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-12043X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0501-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 12043 
ITEM: RADIATOR - PANEL ASSEMBLY 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  I 1  [ I  C l  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-12044X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0580-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 12044 
ITEM: FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS, AND TUBES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-12045X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0580-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 12045 
ITEM: FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS, AND TUBES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  1 3  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 3  1 1  [ I  1 3  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-132OOX 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0330-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13200 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. THE 
ACCUMULATOR WAS CONSIDERED ONE ITEM DURING THE ORIGINAL IOA 
ANALYSIS AND INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS WERE NOT ANALYZED. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/20/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13201X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0311-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13201 
ITEM: FLASH EVAPORATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE / 1 [ I  ( 1  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  C A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM-ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. THE 
FAILURE IS A FAILURE OF THE FREON LOOPS AND WAS NOT CONSIDERED AS 
PART OF THE FLASH EVAPORATOR ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13202X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2176-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13202 
ITEM: FES TOPPING HEATER RPC 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
N E W C X l  
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  C J  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 C l  I 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  I 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
C I *  
[ I  
C J  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 3  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  C l  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13203X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-61-2177-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13203 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE HEATER HDC 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
/ 1 1 1 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
1 -  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13204X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2177-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13204 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE HEATER HDC 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B -  . C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [. 1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13205X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2204-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13205 
ITEM: FES NOZZLE HEATER TYPE I11 HDCs 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A - .  B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. SINCE 
FAILURE CAN RESULT IN A LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR, IOA 
RECOMMENDS THE 3/1R CRITICALITY AS BEING MORE REPRESENTATIVE. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-364 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13206X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2204-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13206 
ITEM: FES NOZZLE HEATER TYPE I11 HDCs 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  -1 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/31/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13207X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2205-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13207 
ITEM: FES HEATER CONTROL TYPE I11 HYBRID DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  E l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. THIS 
FAIWJRE CAN CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR WHICH 
MEANS A 1R CRITICALITY. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS HIGHER CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-366 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/31/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13208X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2205-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13208 
ITEM: FES HEATER CONTROL TYPE I11 HYBRID DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: S . R .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] E l  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1 .  [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-367 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/31/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13209X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2207-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X 1  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13209 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER POWER TYPE I11 HDCs 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from N M A )  
[ .  / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/31/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1321OX 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6W-2251-2 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13210 
ITEM: FES INPUT DIODE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: . (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/31/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13211X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-61-2258-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13211 
ITEM: FES TOPPING DUCT HEATER DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 1 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. IOA 
FEELS THE HIGHER CRITICALITY IS MORE REPRESENTATIVE, HOWEVER, 
SINCE THE LOSS CAN LEAD TO A LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR AND A 
LOSS OF MISSION. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13212X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2083-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13212 
ITEM: FES SONIC NOZZLE RESISTORS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE' [ 1 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. SINCE 
FAILURE COULD LEAD TO LOSS OF NOZZLE HEATERS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE 
HIGHER FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13213X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2087-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13213 
ITEM: FES GPC CONTROL CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] E l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-372 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13214X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2092-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13214 
ITEM: RESISTOR - FES TOPPING DUCT HEATER STATUS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-373 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13215X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2093-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13215 
ITEM: RESISTOR - HIGH LOAD DUCT HEATER STATUS 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  C I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) . 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-374 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/20/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13216X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2351-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13216 
ITEM: FES HEATERS AND THERMOSTATS - FEEDWATER LINE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  c I -  [ 1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. THE 
INDIVIDUAL HEATERS AND THERMAL SWITCHES WERE COVERED IN THE 
MECHANICAL SECTION, BUT THERE WAS NO OVERALL FMEA, SUCH AS THIS 
ONE, IN THE EPD&C SECTION. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-375 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/20/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-13217X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6W-2253-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13217 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER DIODES 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] I 1  [ I  [ I  I 1  
COMPARE [ /N ] C N I  [ N I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 r I -  1 [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE INTERNAL SHORT OF THE DIODE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-376 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1403OX 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0401-1 
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14030 
ITEM: NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  C P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  C P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C l  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-377 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT : 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1/ 04/8 8 
ATCS-14031X 
06-3-0401-2 
ATCS 
14031 
"3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER 
S . K .  SINCLAIR 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
NASA [ 1 / 1  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] E l  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  I 1  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS, 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-378 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-14032X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0408-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14032 
ITEM: TANK ISOLATION VALVE (NC) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different. from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. SINCE 
FIRST FAILURE LEADS TO THE LOSS OF ONE ABS, IOA RECOMMENDS THE 
HIGHER CRITICALITY AS BEING MORE REALISTIC AND REPRESENTATIVE. 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 c-379 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-14033X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0408-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14033 
ITEM: "3 TANK ISOLATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA ( 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C l  [ I  C l  C A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
C / l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-14034X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0414-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14034 
ITEM: "3 FILL AND DRAIN QUICK DISCONNECTS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ ] ' [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
FAILURE OCCURS DURING A PHASE NOT CONSIDERED DURING THE ORIGINAL 
IOA ANALYSIS (GROUND SERVICING). 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-381 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-14035X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0414-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM : ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14035 
ITEM: "3 FILL AND DRAIN QUICK DISCONNECTS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. THIS 
FAILURE OCCURS DURING A PHASE NOT CONSIDERED DURING THE ORIGINAL 
IOA ANALYSIS (GROUND SERVICING). 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-382 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-14036X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0414-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14036 
ITEM: NH3 FILL AND DRAIN QUICK DISCONNECTS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  [ : X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
C A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. IOA 
CONSIDERED THE QUICK DISCONNECTS AS SINGLE ITEMS WITHOUT REGARD 
FOR INTERNAL FAILURES. THUS, THIS FAILURE MODE WAS NOT EXAMINED 
DURING THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS PHASE. I 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-383 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WOFtKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-14037X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0416-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14037 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS - AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
c 3  [ I  [ I  E A 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-384 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-14038X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-3-0405-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14038 
ITEM: AMMONIA SUPPLY TANK 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  r I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  I 1  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) * [ /  I [ I  [ I  [ 1. 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NEW ITEM ADDED TO IOA DATA BASE DURING ASSESSMENT PROCESS. THIS 
FAILURE IS A FAILURE OF A PRESSURE VESSEL. 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 C-385 
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APPENDIX D 
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS 
D-1 
I ATCS POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS 
NASA-FMEA MDAC FLIGHT ITEM NAME FAILURE MODE 
I ......................................................................... EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 06-3-0112-2 
06-3-0112-3 
06-3-0102-1 
06-3-0102-2 
06-3-0103-1 
06-3-0112-2 
06-3-0104-2 
06-3-0101-3 
06-3-0104-2 
06-3-0108-2 
06-3-0112-2 
06-3-0112-3 
06-3-0207-1 
06-3-0207-6 
06-3-0207-5 
06-3-0207-2 
06-3-0207-2 
06-3-0207-4 
06-3-0301-3 
06-3-0301-2 
I 
I 
I 06-3-0301-4 
I 06-3-0301-1 
06-3-0304-3 
06-3-0304-1 
I 06-3-0390-1 
1000 
1001 
1003 
1004 
1005 
1006 
1009 
1011 
1014 
1016 
1017 
1018 
1019 
1020 
1021 
1022 
1023 
1024 
1025 
1026 
1027 
1028 
1030 
1032 
1033 
1034 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/ 1R 
2/ 1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
3/1R 
2/1R 
3/1R 
2/1R 
2/ 1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
1/ 1 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/ 1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/ 1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/ 1R 
INLET SELF-SEALING 
COUPLING 
ORIFICE INLET COUPLING 
INLET FILTER - 
ACCUMULATOR 
INLET FILTER - 
ACCUMULATOR 
ACCUMULATOR 
SELF-SEALING DISCONNECT 
INLET FILTER FREON 
PUMP 
FREON PUMP 
OUTLET FILTER 
CHECK VALVE 
OUTLET SELF-SEALING 
COUPLING 
ORIFICE (OUTLET 
COUPLING) 
FUEL CELL HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
FUEL CELL HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
FUEL CELL HEAT 
EXCHANGERS 
FUEL CELL HEAT . 
EXCHANGER 
FUEL CELL HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
FUEL CELL HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
HYDRAULIC HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
HYDRAULIC HEAT 
EXCHANGERS 
HYDRAULIC HEAT 
EXCHANGERS 
HYDRAULIC HEAT 
EXCHANGERS 
HYDRAULIC HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
GSE HEAT EXCHANGERS 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
( RUPTURE ) 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
(RUPTURE) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
(RUPTURE) 
FAILS TO CLOSE 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(F21 TO FC40) 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(F21 TO F21) 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FC40 TO FC40) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FREON) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FC40) 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
INT LEAKAGE (F21 
TO HYD FLUID) 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FREON TO FREON) 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(HYDRAULIC TO HYD) 
EXTERNAL LSAKAGE 
(FREON 21) 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
(FREON 21) 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(F21 TO GSE LINES) 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(F21 TO F21) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FREON 21) 
(F21) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
D-2 
I 
I 
1 
11 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
~I I 
ATCS POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS - CONT'D. 
06-3-0304-2 
06-3-0201-2 
06-3-0201-3 
06-3-0201-4 
06-3-0390-1 
06-3-0201-1 
06-3-0223-4 
06-3-0223-3 
06-3-0390-1 
06-3-0223-2 
06-3-0212-2 
06-3-0390-1 
06-3-0220-2 
06-3-0220-3 
06-3-0220-4 
06-3-0220-4 
06-3-0390-1 
06-3-0215-2 
06-3-0215-1 
06-3-0307-1 
06-3-0390-1 
06-3-0307-2 
1036 
1037 
1038 
1039 
1040 
1041 
1042 
1043 
1044 
1045 
1048 
1049 
1051 
1053 
1055 
1056 
1057 
1058 
1058A 
1059 
1060 
1061 
1062 
1063 
1065 
1066 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/ 1.R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/2 
2/ 1R 
2/ 1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
02 RESTRICTOR 
02 RESTRICTOR 
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER 
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER 
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER 
PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER 
SERVICING QUICK 
DISCONNECT CAP 
FLOW PROPORTIONING VLV 
FLOW PROPORTIONING VLV 
FLOW PROPORTIONING VLV 
FLOW PROPORTIONING VLV 
ACTUATOR (FLOW PROP 
VALVE) 
MIDBODY COLDPLATES 
MIDBODY COLDPLATES 
MIDBODY COLDPLATES 
ORIFICE (AFT AVIONICS 
COLDPLATES) 
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES 
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES 
D-3 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
(FREON 21) 
EXT LEAKAGE (02) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FREON 21) 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FREON TO WATER) 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FREON TO FREON) 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(WATER TO WATER) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FREON 21) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(WATER) 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
(FREON 21) 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
(WATER) 
INT LEAK (F21 TO 
TO PL XCHNG FLUID) 
(FREON TO FREON) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FREON 21) 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
FAILS TO REMAIN 
CLOSED 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
FAILS IN INTER 
POSIT, RTRCTD FLW 
FAILS IN PL OR 
EXCHNGR POSIT 
FAILS IN PL OR 
EXCHNGR POSIT 
FAILS TO START 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(F2U 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
06-3-0307-1 
06-3-0230-2 
06-3-0390-1 
06-3-0230-1 
06-3-0390-1 
05-6W-2008-1 
05-6W-2043-1 
05-6W-2043-3 
05-6W-2 043-2 
06-3-0520-1 
06-3-0520-1 
06-3-0580-1 
06-3-0502-3 
06-3-0502-4 
06-3-0302-2 
06-3-0502-1 
06-3-0520-1 
06-3-0502-2 
06-3-0504-3 
06-3-0504-4 
06-3-0504-1 
06-3-0504-2 
06-3-0520-1 
06-3-0504-2 
06-3-0520-1 
06-3-0508-1 
1067 
1069 
1070 
1071 
1072 
1085 
1086 
1087 
1088 
2 / 1 R  
2 / 1 R  
2 / 1 R  
2 / 1 R  
2 / 1 R  
2 / 1 R  
2 / 1 R  
2/2 
2/ 1 R  
2000 2 / 1 R  
2001 2 / 1 R  
2002 2 / 1 R  
2603 2/2 
2 0 0 3 A  2/2 
2004 2 / 1 R  
2 0 0 4 A  2 / 1 R  
2005 2 / 1 R  
2006 2 / 1 R  
2007 2/2 
2 0 0 7 A  2/2 
2008 2 / 1 R  
2 0 0 8 A  2 / 1 R  
2009 2 / 1 R  
2010 2 / 1 R  
2011 2 / 1 R  
2 0 1 5 B  3 / 1 R  
05-6W-2034-3 2 0 1 7 A  2 / 1 R  
05-6W-2038-2 2024 2/2 
05-6W-2014-1 2025 3 / 1 R  
05-6W-2203-1 2033 3 / 1 R  
06-3-0322-3 3010 3 / 1 R  
I 06-3-0322-3 3007 3 / 1 R  
AFT AVIONICS COLDPLATES 
RGA COLDPLATES 
RGA COLDPLATES 
RGA COLDPLATES 
FREON LOOP L I N E S  AND 
F I T T I N G S  
CB (FREON FLOW 
PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
SWITCH (FLOW 
PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
SWITCH (FLOW 
. PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
SWITCH 2 1  (FLOW 
PROPORTIONING VALVE) 
INLET SELF-SEALING 
COUPLING 
OUTLET SELF-SEALING 
COUPLING 
FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS, 
TUBES 
FLOW CONTROL VALVE 
FLOW CONTROL VALVE ' 
FLOW CONTROL VALVE 
FLOW CONTROL VALVE 
FLOW CONTROL VALVE 
STEPPING MOTOR 
(FLOW CONTROL VALVE) 
BYPASS VALVE 
BYPASS VALVE 
BYPASS VALVE 
BYPASS VALVE 
BYPASS VALVE 
MOTOR (BYPASS VALVE) 
MODE CONTROL VALVE 
TEMP SENSOR 
SWITCH 2 6  (RAD 
CONTROL LOOP) 
SWITCH 2 5  (RAD CNTRL 
OUTLET TEMP) 
CB (RAD BYPASS VLV) 
HYBRID DRIVER 
H I  LOAD I S O L  VALVE 
H I  LOAD PLSR VALVE 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE I 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
F A I L S  WITH VLV I N  I 
MID-TRAVEL P O S I T  
I 
1 
F A I L S  I N  INTRCHNGW 
P O S I T I O N  
F A I L S  I N  PL HX 
P O S I T I O N  
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
F A I L S  TO OPEN 
F A I L S  TO OPEN 
F A I L S  TO CLOSE, 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
F A I L S  TO CLOSE, 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
F A I L S  TO START 
F A I L S  I N  BYPASS 
F A I L S  I N  BYPASS 
F A I L S  I N  RAD FLOW 
F A I L S  I N  RAD FLOW 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
F A I L S  TO START 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
F A I L S  OFF-SCALE 
F A I L S  I N  OFF 
F A I L S  I N  H I  
P O S I T I O N  
OPEN 
OPEN 
F A I L S  OPEN 
F A I L S  OPEN 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I D-4 
ATCS POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS - CONT'D. 
NASA-FMEA MDAC FLIGHT ITEM NAME FAILURE MODE 
06-3-0311-5 
06-3-0311-1 
06-3-0311-5 
06-3-0311-4 
06-3-0311-5 
06-3-0311-4 
06-3-0326-1 
06-3-0314-1 
06-3-0323-4 
06-3-0311-1 
06-3-03 11-5 
06-3-03 11-5. 
06-3-0311-5 
06-3-0323-5 
06-3-0311-5 
06-3-0311-5 
06-3-0327-1 
06-3-0313-1 
06-3-0330-1 
05-6W-2030-3 
05-6W-2031-2 
05-6w-2028-3 
05-6W-203 1-1 
06-3-0322-3 
05-6W-2052-1 
05-6W-2053-1 
3012 
3013 
3014 
3015 
3016 
3017 
3019 
3020 
3029 
3030 
3036 
3045 
3046 
3047 
3048 
3049 
3051 
3052 
3053 
3060 
3067 
3079 
3079A 
3088 
3089 
3106 
3118 
3128 
1/ 1 
1/ 1 
2/1R 
2/1R 
1/ 1 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
3/2R 
2/ 1R 
2/ 1R 
1/ 1 
2/1R 
2/2 
2/1R 
2/ 1R 
2/2 
2/2 
2/1R 
2/ 1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
3/ 1R 
3/ 1R 
2/2 
2/ 1R 
HI LOAD EVAP CORE 
HI LOAD VLV MTG PLATE 
HI LOAD/VALVE 
MOUNTING PLATE 
HI LOAD VALVE 
MOUNTING PLATE 
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR 
ACOD 
HI LOAD EVAPORATOR 
ACOD 
HI LOAD EXIT DUCT 
HI LOAD EXIT DUCT 
HI LOAD NOZZLE 
HI LOAD NOZZLE 
TOPPING EVAP ISOL VLV 
TOPPING EVAP H20 
VLV/NZL MTG PLATE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
WATER VLV/NOZZLE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
WATER VLV NOZZLE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
CORE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
CORE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
ACOD 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
ACOD . 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
EXIT DUCT 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
SONIC NOZZLES 
FES FEEDLINE A/B 
FES CONTROLLER-SWITCH 
FES CONTROLLER-SWITCH 
HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH 
HI-LOAD ENABLE SWITCH 
HI LOAD PLSR ELECTRNC 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
HEATER SELECT SWITCH 
HI-LOAD HEATER SWITCH 
D-5 
INT LEAK (FREON) 
INT RESTRICTED 
FLOW OF FREON 
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL 
LEAKAGE (FREON) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, 
STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FREON TO WATER) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
(FREON) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NO FLOW 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
FAILS OPEN 
NO FREON FLOW 
LEAK BETWEEN WATER 
AND FREON 
STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
(RUPTURE) 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE - 
FREON 
RESTRICTED FLOW - 
WATER 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE - 
FREON 
STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
( RUPTURE ) 
RESTRICTED FLOW - 
WATER 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAKAGE 
FAILS IN ttON" 
FAILS IN "ON" 
CONTACT (S) STUCK 
IN OFF POSITION 
CONTACT ( S ) NOT 
MAKING IN OFF 
GEN FAST FREQ 
FAILS IN OFF 
FAILED TO "OFF" 
1 ATCS POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS - CONCLD. 
NASA-FMEA MDAC FLIGHT ITEM NAME FAILURE MODE 
I ......................................................................... F A I L S  TO OPEN 
F A I L S  TO CLOSE 
4001 2 / 1 R  
4 0 0 2  2 / 1 R  
4 0 0 5  2 / 1 R  
4006 1/1 
4007 2 / 1 R  
4010 3 / 1 R  
4011  2 / 1 R  
4012 1/1 
"3 R E L I E F  VALVE 
R E L I E F  VALVE 
AMMONIA CONTROLLER A 
AMMONIA CONTROLLER A 
FLOW CONTROL VALVE 
"3 CNTRL TEMP SNSR 
TANK ISOLATION VALVE 
TANK ISOLATION VALVE 
06-3-0413-4 
06-3-0413-2  
06-3-0411-1 
06-3-0411-2  
06-3-0410-1 
06-3 -0403-1  
06 -3 -0408-3  
06 -3 -0408-4  
LOSS OF OUTPUT 
PREMATURE OP 
F A I L S  TO OPEN 
F A I L S  OFF SCALE 
F A I L S  TO OPEN 
F A I L S  TO REMAIN 
CLOSED, EXT LEAK 
INT/EXT LEAKAGE 
(FREON 2 1  TO "3) 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
06-3-0401-3 4013 2 / 1 R  NH3 BOILER/HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
TANKS, L I N E S ,  & 
FITTINGS 
TANKS, LINES,  & 
FITTINGS 
LINES & F I T T I N G S  
S W  4 2  ("3 CONTROLLER) 
4015 2 / 1 R  06-3 -0416-1  
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 06-3-0414-3 4 0 1 5 A  2 / 1 R  
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
F A I L S  TO S W  FROM 
PRI/GPC OR SEC/ON 
F A I L S  TO S W  FROM 
PRI/GPC OR SEC/ON 
F A I L S  TO SWITCH 
FROM OFF 
F A I L S  ON 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
( F C 4 0 )  
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
PAYLOAD COOLANT 
F A I L S  CLOSED 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
06-3-0416-2  
05-6W-2026-2 
4016 1/1 
4 0 2 1  2 / 1 R  
05-6W-2026-3 4 0 2 1 A  2 / 1 R  S W  4 2  ("3 CONTROLLER) 
05-6W-2026-1 4 0 2 2  2 / 1 R  S W  4 2  ("3 CONTROLLER) 
4027 1/1 
11111 2 / 1 R  
HYBRID DRIVER 
FUEL CELL HX 
05-6W-2201-4 
06-3 -0207-3  
SERVICING QD CAP 
PAYLOAD HX 
06-3-0212-3 
06-3 -0223-1  
11112 - 3 / 1 R  
11113 2 / 2  
06-3-0305-2  
06 -3 -0390-2  
11117 3 / 1 R  
1 1 1 2 3  2 / 1 R  
GSE HX, FLUID CONN. 
FREON LOOP LINES & 
FITTINGS 
S W  2 9  (RAD MAN SEL)  
RAD - PANEL ASSEMBLY 
FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS 
& TUBES 
FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS, 
& TUBES 
FES FEEDLINE ACCUM 
FLASH EVAPORATOR 
FES CNTRL HDC 
NH3 BOILER/HX 
05-6W-2036-3 
06-3-0501-3 
06-3-0580-2  
12042 3 / 1 R  
1 2 0 4 3  2 / 2  
12044 2 / 1 R  
SHORTS POLE-POLE 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
PHYSICAL BINDING/ 
JAMMING 
RESTRICTED FLOW 06-3-0580-4 12045 2 / 2  
13200 3 / 1 R  
13201 2 / 1 R  
1 3 2 0 9  3 / 1 R  
14030 2 / 1 R  
JAMMED BELLOWS 
INT LEAKAGE-FREON 
F A I L S  CLOSED 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
FREON 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
"3 LOOP 
F A I L S  TO OPEN 
LEAKAGE 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
BURSTS 
06-3-0330-2  
06-3-0311-3 
05-6W-2207-3 
06-3-0401-1 
06-3-0401-2  1 4 0 3 1  1/1 NH3 BOILER/HX 
14032 2 / 1 R  
14033 1/1 
14036 3 / 1 R  
14037 1/1 
14038 1/1 
TANK ISOL VALVE (NC) 
NH3 TANK I S O L  VALVE 
NH3 FILL t DRAIN QD 
NH3 LINES & FITTINGS 
AMMONIA SUPPLY TANK 
06-3-0408-1 
06-3-0408-2  
06-3-0414-4  
06-3-0416-3 
06-3-0405-1 
D-6 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
APPENDIX E 
DETAILED ANALYSIS 
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing 
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA87001- 
005, Analysis of the Active Thermal Control System, (01 December 
1987). Prior results were obtained independently and documented 
before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental 
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously 
considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item 
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each 
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and 
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as 
described in NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and u, PCN-2. 6 ADril 1987. Failure mode effects are described at the 
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at 
the top. 
Hardware Criticalities: 
1 = Loss of life or vehicle 
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item 
3 = All others 
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle 
Functional Criticalities: 
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, 
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, 
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle. 
if failed, could cause loss of mission. 
Redundancy Screen A: - 
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight 
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight 
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight 
NA = Not Applicable 
Redundancy Screens B and C: - 
P = Passed Screen 
F = Failed Screen 
NA = Not Applicable 
E-1 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/07/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11110 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: CHECK VALVE 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED - ACTIVE PUMP 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP 
3) FREON PUMP ASSEMBLY 
4) CHECK VALVE 
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: LIFTOFF: 3/1R 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/1R ATO: . 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 J B [ P l  
HDW/FUNC 
3/ 1R 
3/1R 
3/1R 
3/1R 
C E P J  
LOCATION: -MIDBODY AREA 40 
PART NUMBER: 4OV63PP1 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL 
FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILING THE CHECKVALVE CLOSED ON THE ACTIVE PUMP WILL CAUSE LOSS 
OF THAT PUMP. THE ALTERNATE PUMP IN THE SAME FREON LOOP IS STILL 
AVAILABLE AS IS THE SECOND FREON LOOP. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY 
WILL CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-2 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/06/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11111 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/1R 
ABORT: 2/1R 
ITEM: FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW - FC40 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP 
3) FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGER 
4) FC40 LOOP 
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/1R 
LIFTOFF : 2/1R TAL: 2/1R 
ONORBIT : 2/ 1R AOA: 2/ 1R 
DEORBIT : * 2/1R AT0 : 2/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ P l  C [ P I  
LOCATION : MIDBODY AREA 40 
PART NUMBER: 40V63HXll 
. CAUSES: CONTAMINATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
REDUCED FLOW OF THE FC40 COOLANT WILL RESULT IN INADEQUATE 
COOLING OF THE FUEL CELLS. REDUCED COOLING CAN LEAD TO FUEL CELL 
OVERHEATING WITH ACCOMPANYING LOSS OF MISSION AND POSSIBLE LOSS 
OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-3 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/0 6/8 8 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11112 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 3/ 1R ABORT: 3/1R 
ITEM: SERVICING QUICK DISCONNECT CAP 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP 
3) PLUMBING 
4) SERVICING QUICK DISCONNECT 
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: LIFTOFF: 3/ 1R 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/ 1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F l  
LOCATION : GSE/ECLSS SERVICING PANEL 
PART NUMBER: 40V63MD142 
HDW/F"C 
3/1R 
3/1R 
3/ 1R 
3/ 1R 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CORROSION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE WITHIN THE QUICK DISCONNECT IS CAUSED BY THE 
FAILURE OF ONE OF THE SEALS. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES OF REDUNDANT 
SEALS AND CAP WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP. THE SEAL CANNOT 
BE CHECKED ON THE GROUND AFTER INSTALLATION AND THE FAILURE 
IS NOT DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT - THUS FAILING SCREENS B AND A. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-4 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/06/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11113 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/2 
2/2 ABORT: 
ITEM: PAYLAOD HEAT EXCHANGER 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW - PAYLOAD COOLANT 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP 
3) PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER 
4) PAYLOAD COOLANT LOOP 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9)  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F”C ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF : /NA 
ONORBIT: 2/2 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [  1 
LOCATION : MIDBODY - AREA 40 
PART NUMBER: 40V63HX1 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
A REDUCTION IN FLOW IN THE PAYLOAD COOLANT LOOP WILL RESULT IN 
INADEQUATE PAYLOAD COOLING. IF THE PRIMARY PAYLOAD REQUIRES THE 
COOLING, THEN LOSS OF THE LOOP WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE I 
PRIMARY MISSION. SAFETY OF THE CREW/VEHICLE IS NOT AFFECTED. I 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-5 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/06/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11114 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT : 3/3 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: TEMPERATURE SENSOR, FCL EVAP OUT TEMP 
FAILURE MOdE: 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
2AKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
I ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
I FREON COOLANT LOOP 
I TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F"C 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
AT0 : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B C  3 C I  I 
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: V63T1207A, V63T1407A 
CAUSES : 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS TEMPERATURE SENSOR IS USED TO DETERMINE THE TEMPERATURE OF 
THE FREON COOLANT LOOP AS IT EXITS THE FLASH EVAPORATOR. THE 
RESULT IS ALSO USED TO ILLUMINATE A CtW LIGHT AND PROVIDES INPUT 
TO A METER. LOSS OF THE SENSOR CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS SUCH 
WITH NO IMPACT ON CREW OR MISSION. ERROENOUS OUTPUT CAN BE 
IDENTIFIED BY USING OTHER SENSORS AND DATA SOURCES. 
REFERENCES : 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-6 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/06/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11115 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW - GSE FREON 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP 
3) GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
4 )  
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
AT0 : 
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 
LIFTOFF: /NA 
ONORBIT : /NA 
DEORBIT : f NA 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  3 
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 50V63HX1 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE FREON IN THE GSE HEAT EXCHANGER WILL 
REDUCE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PRE-LAUNCH COOLING. WORST CASE MAY 
CAUSE A DELAY IN THE LAUNCH BUT THE FAILURE DOES NOT AFFECT ON- 
ORBIT OPERATIONS. 22206 GROUNDRULES CALL FOR A 3/3 CRITICALITY 
IN THIS CASE. 
REFERENCES: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-7 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/06/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11116 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER, FLUID CONNECTOR 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP 
3) GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
4) FLUID CONNECTOR 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8 )  
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA 
TAL: /NA 
AOA: /NA 
LIFTOFF : /NA 
AT0 : /NA 
ONORBIT: /MA 
DEORBIT : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 C [  3 
LOCATION : AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 50V63HX1, MC276-0035-1205 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM THE GSE FLUID CONNECTION DURING GROUND 
OPRATIONS HAS NO EFFECT ON ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS. WORST CASE 
EFFECT IS A LAUNCH DELAY WHICH BY 22206 IS A 3/3 CRITICALITY. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-8 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 06/8 8 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT : 3/1R 
MDAC ID: 11117 ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER, FLUID CONNECTOR 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED - RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
EAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1 ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
1 FREON COOLANT LOOP 
I GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
I FLUID CONNECTOR 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/1R 
TAL: 3/1R LIFTOFF : 3/1R 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 3/1R 
DEORBIT : 3/1R ATO: 3/1R 
LANDINGpAFING: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B C F I  C [ P I  
LOCATION : AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 50V63HX1, MC276-0035-1205 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CORR I 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
DURING ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS, THE RELIEF VALVE PREVENTS 
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE GSE FREON LOOP. FAILURE OF THE 
REDUNDANT RELIEF VALVE COULD ALLOW PRESSURE TO BUILD IN THE GSE 
LOOP (DUE TO THERMAL EXPANSION), WITH RESULTING DAMAGE TO THE 
FREON LOOP(S). SINCE THE FAILURE OF THE RELIEF VALVE CANNOT BE 
DETECTED, SCREEN B IS FAILED. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-9 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/06/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11118 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER, FLUID CONNECTOR 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW- GROUND SYSTEM 
LEAD ANALYST: S.R. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP 
3) GSE HEAT EXCHANGER 
4) FLUID CONNECTOR 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA 
TAL: /NA 
AOA: /NA 
LIFTOFF: /NA 
ONORBIT : /NA 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B I  I c c  I 
LOCATION : AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 50V63HX1, MC276-0035-1205 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : 
RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE GSE HEAT EXCHANGER GROUND SYSTEM WILL 
RESULT IN INADEQUATE COOLING DURING GROUND OPERATIONS. WORST 
CASE RESULT WILL BE A LAUNCH DELAY WHICH IS A 3/3 CRITICALITY BY 
22206. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-10 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 07/8 8 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11119 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKERS (FREON PUMP) 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN - MANUALLY 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C 
3) FREON PUMPS A (B) 
4) PANEL L4 
5) CIRCUIT BREAKERS 
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
AT0 : 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 . 
DEORBIT : . 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
c c  1 
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30 
PART NUMBER: 31V73A4-CB19-27, CB39-41 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILURE OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO OPEN WHEN MANUALLY PULLED WILL 
PROTECTION AGAINST CURRENT SURGES. THEREFORE, THIS FAILURE WILL 
HAVE NO EFFECT. 
HAVE NO EFFECT ON ITS INTENDED OPERATION. THERE WILL STILL BE 
REFERENCES: 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-11 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/07/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11120 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER (FREON FLOW PROPORTIONING) 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN - MANUALLY 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C 
3) FLOW PROPORTIONING MODULE 
4) PANEL L4 
5) CIRCUIT BREAKERS 
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9)  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
AT0 : 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I B r  1 
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30 
PART NUMBER: 31V73A4CB42, CB45 
HDW/F"C 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
c c  1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILURE OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO OPEN MANUALLY WILL HAVE NO 
AGAINST CURRENT SURGES. THEREFORE, THIS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO 
EFFECT. 
EFFECT ON ITS INTENDED OPERATION. THERE WILL STILL BE PROTECTION 
I REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-12 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/07/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11121 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: SW10, 11 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER) 
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS TO GROUND BOTH SIDES 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP EPDtC 
3) INSTRUMENTATION 
4) PANEL 017 
5) SWITCHES 10, 11 
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 c r  1 
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30 
PART NUMBER: 33V73A17-Sl0, S11 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART 
FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILURE ELIMINATES ONE SOURCE OF POWER FOR THE FREON SIGNAL 
CONDITIONER. ALTERNATE SOURCE/PATH STILL AVAILABLE AS ARE 
ALTERNATE DATA SOURCES. THEREFORE, THIS FAILURE RECEIVES A 3/3 
CRITICALITY . 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-13 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/07/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 11122 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: ’ 3/3 
ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: FREON PUMP RELAY 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP EPD&C 
3) FREONPUMPA 
4) RELAY 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F”C ABORT HDW/F”C 
RTLS : /NA 
TAL: /NA 
AOA: /NA 
ATO: /NA 
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 
LIFTOFF : /NA 
ONORBIT : /NA 
DEORBIT : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  3 c c  3 
LOCATION : MIDBODY 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS RELAY PROVIDES A POWER PATH FOR GSE CHECKOUT. THE ONLY TIME 
IT IS USED/REQUIRED IS DURING GROUND OPERATIONS AND THE RELAY IS 
DESIGNED TO REMAIN OPEN DURING ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS. IF IT FAILS 
TO CLOSE DURING PRE-FLIGHT TESTS, THE WORST CASE RESULT 
WILL BE A LAUNCH DELAY WHICH BY 22206 IS A 3/3 CRITICALITY. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-14 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/13/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 2/ 1R 
MDAC ID: 11123 ABORT: 2/1R I 
ITEM: FREON LOOP LINES AND FITTINGS 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FREON COOLANT LOOP 
3) LINES AND FITTINGS 
4 )  
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
LIFTOFF : 2/1R TAL: 
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 2/1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P l  
LOCATION: MIDBODY 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE 
W.E. PARKMAN 
HDW/FUNC 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
2/1R 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
RESTRICTED FLOW ANYWHERE IN THE FREON LOOP WILL RESULT IN REDUCED 
COOLING MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
COOLING CAPABILITY AND A SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL I 
I 
I 
REFERENCES : i 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-15 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/08/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 12040 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER 14 (FREON RADIATOR CONTROLLER) 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN - MANUALLY 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY - EPD&C 
3) RADIATOR FLOW CONTROL VALVE 
4) PANEL 015 (014) 
5) CB14, 15 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F”C ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
AT0 : 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [  1 C E  1 
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30 
PART NUMBER: 33V73A15-CB14, CB15; 33V73A14-CB14, C15 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILURE OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO OPEN WHEN MANUALLY PULLED WILL 
NOT AFFECT ITS ELECTRICAL OPERATION. THE CB WILL STILL PROTECT 
AGAINST CURRENT SURGES WHICH IS ITS PRIMARY PURPOSE. THEREFORE 
THIS FAILURE HAS NO AFFECT. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-16 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
DATE : 1/08/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 
MDAC ID: 12041 ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER (RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE) 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN - MANUALLY 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY - EPD&C 
3) RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE 
4) PANEL 014 
5) CIRCUIT BREAKER 
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
AT0 : 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30 
PART "MBER: 31V73A4-CB128, 129, 44, 47 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE 
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILURE OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO OPEN WHEN MANUALLY PULLED WILL I 
NOT AFFECT ITS PRIMARY PURPOSE OF CURRENT SURGE PROTECTION. 
THEREFORE, THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. I 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-17 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/12/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 12042 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT: 3/1R 
ITEM: SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT) 
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS POLE TO POLE IN EITHER POSITION 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY - EPDCC 
3) RADIATOR BYPASS VALVE 
4) PANEL L1A2 
5) SWITCH 29, 30 
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: LIFTOFF: 3/1R 
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ F l  
HDW/FUNC 
3/ 1R 
3/1R 
3/1R 
3/1R 
C [ P I  
LOCATION: FLIGHT DECK - AREA 30 
PART NUMBER: 31V73AlA2-S29, 530 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
A POLE TO POLE SHORT IS AN EXTENDED CASE OF FAILING TO TRANSFER 
FROM A POSITION. SINCE THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH RAD FLOW AND BYPASS 
POSITIONS, IT IS BEING ASSIGNED THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY AS 
DEFINED IN IOA F'MEA 2027. SCREEN B FAILS SINCE ONE FAILURE 
ELIMINATES BOTH REDUNDANT CONTACT SETS ON A SINGLE SWITCH. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-18 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 12/88 
MDAC ID: 12043 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/2 
ABORT: 2/2 
ITEM: RADIATOR - PANEL ASSEMBLY 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
IAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
I ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
I RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY 
I PANELS 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : /NA 
TAL: /NA 
AOA: /NA 
AT0 : 2/2 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF : /NA 
ONORBIT: 2/2 
DEORBIT: /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B I  1 c c  
LOCATION : 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE RADIATORS WILL RESULT IN 
COOLING OF ORBITER SYSTEMS. LOSS OF ONE RADIATOR IS 
DURATION FLIGHT. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-19 
1 
FAILURE 
INADEQUATE 
A MINIMUM 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/12/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS FLIGHT: 2/1R 
MDAC ID: 12044 ABORT: 2/1R 
ITEM: FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS, AND TUBES 
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) 
3) FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS, AND TUBES 
RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY 
4 )  
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
LIFTOFF : /NA TAL: 
ONORBIT : 2/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 J B [ P l  
LOCAT ION : PAYLOAD BAY 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
A JAMMING OF THE FLEX HOSE CONTAINER ASSEMBLY DURING RADIATOR 
DEPLOYMENT OR RETRACTION COULD RESULT IN INCOMPLETE DEPLOYMENT OR 
RETRACTION. WORST CASE WOULD RESULT IN EITHER LOSS OF COOLING 
FROM THE AFFECTED RADIATOR OR POSSIBLE INABILITY TO CLOSE 
THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS DUE TO DEPLOYED RADIATOR. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-20 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 12045 
1/ 12/ 8 8 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/2 
2/ 2 ABORT: 
ITEM: FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS, AND TUBES 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2)  RADIATOR AND FLOW CONTROL ASSEMBLY 
3) FLEX HOSES, MANIFOLDS, AND TUBES 
4)  
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
ATO: 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 2/2 
ONORBIT : 2/2 
DEORBIT : 2/2 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 
LOCATION : MIDBODY 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
RESTRICTED FLOW OF FREON THROUGH THE FLEX HOSES WILL RESULT IN 
RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE RADIATORS AND INADEQUATE VEHICLE 
COOLING. LOSS OF ONE RADIATOR IS A MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-2 1 
I 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/3 0/87 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13200 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 3/ 1R ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR 
FAILURE MODE : JAMMED BELLOWS 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM 
3) ACCUMULATOR 
4) BELLOWS 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 3/1R 
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: . 
DEORBIT : 3/ 1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ F l  
LOCATION : AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: TBD 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK 
HDW/F"C 
3/1R 
3/ 1R 
3/1R 
3/1R 
I 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
A JAMMED BELLOWS IN THE ACCUMULATOR MEANS AN INCORRECT LINE 
PRESSURE MAY BE MAINTAINED RESULTING IN INCORRECT FES OPERATION. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FH, 60FJ), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2, JSC 
FLIGHT RULES 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-22 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/2 0/88 
MDAC ID: 13201 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/1R 
ABORT: 2/ 1R 
ITEM: FLASH EVAPORATOR 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE - FREON 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM 
3) FREON LOOPS 
4 )  
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 2/1R 
TAL: 2/1R LIFTOFF : 2/1R 
DEORBIT : 2/ 1R AT0 : 2/1R 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
ONORBIT : 2/1R AOA: . 2/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P l  C C P I  
LOCATION: 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LEAKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO FmON LOOPS MEANS DEORBIT AT NEXT PRIMARY 
LANDING SITE. ADDITIONAL FAILURES CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-2 3 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/30/87 
MDAC ID: 13202 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: FES TOPPING HEATER RPC 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM 
3) TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
4) HEATERS 
5) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/F"C 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
. AOA : 3/3 
AT0 : 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B E  1 c c  3 
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: TBD 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE HEATER RPCs FAILED CLOSED AND CONDUCT POWER TO THE HEATERS 
PREMATURELY. ACTUAL OPERATION OF THE HEATERS IS CONTROLLED BY 
THERMOSTAT. THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. 
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FN), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-24 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
DATE : 12/30/87 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13203 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT: 3/1R 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE HEATER HDC 
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C 
3) FEEDLINE HEATER SYSTEM 
4) TYPE I11 HDC 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/F"C 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 3/1R 
DEORBIT : 3/ 1R ATO: 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [NA 1 C C P I  
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: TBD 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
A LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM THE HDCs WILL MEAN A LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED 
SET OF FEEDLINE HEATERS. LOSS OF ALL HEATERS ON THE FES 
FEEDLINES WILL MEAN A LOSS OF ALL FES COOLING AND A POSSIBLE LOSS 
OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
I 
I 
1 
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-25 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/30/87 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13204 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE HEATER HDC 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C 
3) FEEDLINE HEATER SYSTEM 
4) TYPE I11 HDC 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F"C 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
AT0 : 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C  I C [  1 
LOCATION : AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
A PREMATURE CLOSING OF THE HDC WILL MEAN POWER IS APPLIED TO THE 
FES FEEDLINE HEATER CIRCUIT AT OTHER THAN EXPECTED TIMES. ACTUAL 
OPERATION OF THE HEATERS IS CONTROLLED BY THE THERMOSTAT AND THIS 
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. 
REFERENCES: VS70-960102 (60FL), SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-26 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/30/87 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13205 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/ 1R 
ITEM: FES NOZZLE HEATER TYPE I11 HDCs 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM E P D K  
3) NOZZLE HEATER SYSTEMS 
4) TYPE I11 HDCs 
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 
ONORBIT t 3/2R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/ 1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B P A  1 
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/1R 
3/1R 
c r p 1  
LOCATION : AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM THE NOZZLE HEATER HDCs MEANS A LOSS OF POWER 
TO THE ASSOCIATED HEATER CIRCUITS. THIS MAY ALLOW THE NOZZLES TO 
FREEZE UP AND CAUSE AN EFFECTIVE LOSS OF THE EVAPORATOR. IF THE 
HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR IS LOST, AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE CAN 
CAUSE THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES: SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-27 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/30/87 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13206 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: FES NOZZLE HEATER TYPE I11 HDCs 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARXMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C 
3) NOZZLE HEATER SYSTEMS 
4) TYPE I11 HDCs 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F"C 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
AT0 : 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
. ONORBIT: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  3 C [  3 
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILING THE HDCs CLOSED WILL MEAN THAT POWER WILL BE APPLIED TO 
THE HEATER CIRCUIT AT OTHER THAN NOMINAL TIMES. ACTUAL OPERATION 
OF THE HEATERS IS CONTROLLED BY THERMOSTATS AND THIS FAILURE HAS 
NO EFFECT. 
REFERENCES: SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-28 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/31/87 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13207 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT: 3/1R 
ITEM: FES HEATER CONTROL TYPE I11 HYBRID DRIVER 
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT TO GROUND 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
IAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
I ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
I FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM 
I HEATERS 
I TYPE I11 HYBRID DRIVER 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 3/3. 
LIFTOFF: 3/2R 
DEORBIT : 3/1R ATO: 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA 1 C [ P I  
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILURE OF THE HYBRID DRIVER MEANS THAT POWER WILL NOT BE 
AVAIALBE TO THE ASSOCIATED HEATER. LOSS OF ALL FES HEATING CAN 
LEAD TO FREEZING AND A LOSS OF THE EVAPORATOR. 
REFERENCES: SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-29 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/31/87 
MDAC ID: 13208 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 3/3 ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: FES HEATER CONTROL TYPE I11 HYBRID DRIVER 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM 
3) HEATERS 
4) TYPE I11 HYBRID DRIVER 
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
AT0 : 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  3 
LOCATION : AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 
HDW/F”C 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
c c  3 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
1 
1 
IF THE HYBRID DRIVER FAILS CLOSED, POWER WILL BE APPLIED TO THE 
FES HEATER CIRCUIT AT A TIME OTHER THAN NOMINAL. ACTUAL 
OPERATION OF THE HEATERS IS CONTROLLED BY THE THERMOSTATS AND 
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. 
I REFERENCES: SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-30 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
MDAC ID: 13209 
12/ 3 1/ 8 7 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT: 3/1R 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER POWER TYPE I11 HDCs 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM 
3) CONTROLLER POWER 
4) TYPE I11 HDC 
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/1R 
TAL: 3/1R 
AOA: 3/1R 
AT0 : 3/1R 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
ONORBIT: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/1R 
DEORBIT : 3/ 1R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F l  C C P I  
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
IF THE DRIVER CLOSES PREMATURELY, POWER WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO 
THE CONTROLLER AT OTHER THAN NOMINAL TIMES. THIS ALLOWS THE 
EVAPORATORS TO OPERATE AT LOWER THAN RATED ALTITUDES AND POSSIBLY 
LOSE THE EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE HIGH LOAD CAN LEAD TO LOSS 
OF THE CREW/VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-31 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/31/87 
MDAC ID: 13210 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: FES INPUT DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS - INTERNALLY 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM 
3 )  INPUT POWER 
4 )  DIODE 
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8 )  
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL : 
AOA: 
AT0 : 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/ 3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [  1 
LOCATION : AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 
HDW/F"C 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
INTERNAL SHORT OF THE DIODE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. 
REFERENCES: SSSH 7 . 3  SHEET 1 OF 2 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-32 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/31/87 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13211 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/2R 
ITEM: FES TOPPING DUCT HEATER DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
SAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
I ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
I FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM 
I TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
I DUCT HEATERS 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW)FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
ONORBIT: . 3/2R AOA: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/2R 
DEORBIT : 3/2R AT0 : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [NA 3 C [ P l  
LOCATION : AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILURE OF THE DIODE WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF POWER GETTING TO 
THE DUCT HEATERS, POSSIBLE FREEZE UP OF THE DUCT, AND LOSS OF THE 
TOPPING EVAPORATOR. LOSS OF THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR WILL MEAN 
LOSS OF MISSION. 
REFERENCES: SSSH 7.3 SHEET 1 OF 2 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-3 3 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/12/88 
MDAC ID: 13212 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT : 3/2R 
ABORT: 3/2R 
ITEM: FES SONIC NOZZLE RESISTORS 
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM 
3) TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
4) SONIC NOZZLE - HEATERS 
5) CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS 
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS: /NA 
TAL: /NA 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 3/2R 
DEORBIT : 3/2R AT0 : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P l  C I P I  
LOCATION: PANEL L1A2 
PART NUMBER: RLR42C120GM 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF THE CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF 
THE ASSOCIATED SONIC NOZZLE HEATERS. LOSS OF ALL NOZZLE HEATERS 
COULD RESULT IN A FREEZE UP OF THE NOZZLE, LOSS OF THE TOPPING 
EVAPORATOR, AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF MISSION. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-34 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/12/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13213 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT: 3/1R 
ITEM: FES GPC CONTROL CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR 
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM - EPD&C 
3) CONTROLLER POWER 
4) GPC CONTROL 
5) RESISTOR 
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/ 1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [NA 1 
HDW/FUNC 
3/1R 
3/1R 
3/1R 
3/1R 
C [ P I  
LOCATION: PANEL L1A2 
PART NUMBER: RLRSOS1211FR 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE RESISTOR IS PART OF THE INPUT POWER/GPC COMMAND PATH. IF IT 
OPENS, THEN ONE PATH FOR COMMANDING THE FESs ON AND OFF IS LOST. 
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IN COMMANDING THE FES CAN RESULT IN LOSS 
OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-35 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/12/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13214 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: RESISTOR - FES TOPPING DUCT HEATER STATUS 
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM - EPD&C 
3) TOPPING EVAPORATOR 
4) DUCT HEATERS 
5) STATUS MONITORING RESISTOR 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
AT0 : 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3k3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [  1 C [  1 
LOCATION: PANEL L1A2 
PART NUMBER: RLR07C5101GR 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, THERMAL SHOCK 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS RESISTOR PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING TO THE MDM STATUS 
MONITORING CIRCUIT. LOSS OF THIS RESISTOR WILL RESULT IN A LOSS 
OF STATUS AND WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON SYSTEM OPERATION. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-36 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 12/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13215 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: RESISTOR - HIGH LOAD DUCT HEATER STATUS 
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM 
3) HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR 
4) DUCT HEATERS 
5) STATUS MONITORING CIRCUIT 
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9)  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
AT0 : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [  1 c c  1 
LOCATION : PANEL L1A2 
PART NUMBER: RLR07C5101GR 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, THERMAL SHOCK 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS RESISTOR FAILING OPEN WILL RESULT ONLY IN A LOSS OF HEATER 
STATUS TO THE MDM WITH NO AFFECT ON OPERATIONS. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-37 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/20/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 13216 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 3/1R ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: FES HEATERS AND THERMOSTATS - FEEDWATER LINE 
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTS TO 
GROUND 
I LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C 
3) FEEDWATER LINES 
4) HEATERS AND THERMOSTATS 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8 )  
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: LIFTOFF: 3/1R 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
I REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA 1 
I 
LOCATION: 
PART NUMBER: 
HDW/FUNC 
3/1R 
3/1R 
3/1R 
3/1R 
C I P I  
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF HEATERS CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF THE FEEDLINES. LOSS OF 
FEEDLINES CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF BOTH EVAPORATORS. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-38 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/2 0/88 
MDAC ID: 13217 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
3/3 ABORT : 
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER DIODES 
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) FLASH EVAPORATOR SYSTEM EPD&C 
3) CONTROLLER 
4) DIODES 
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
AT0 : 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [  1 c c  1 
LOCATION: 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD 
EFFECTS/R?iTIONALE: 
NONE 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-39 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/04/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14030 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/1R 
ABORT: 2/1R 
ITEM: NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW - FREON 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM 
3) NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER 
4) NH3/FREON INTERFACE 
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9)  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 2/1R 
TAL: 2/1R 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 2/1R 
ONORBIT : 2/1R AOA: 2/ 1R 
DEORBIT : 2/1R ATO: 2/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B I P I  C [ P I  
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
RESTRICTED FLOW OF FREON THROUGH THE AMMONIA BOILER HEAT 
EXCHANGER WILL MEAN INADEQUATE COOLING OF CRITICAL ORBITER 
COMPONENTS. WORST CASE WILL MEAN A LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED FREON 
LOOP. LOSS OF BOTH FREON LOOPS MEANS LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
(THIS FAILURE ALSO COVERED IN FREON LOOP FMEAs).  
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-40 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/04/88 
MDAC ID: 14031 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 1/ 1 
ABORT: 1/ 1 
ITEM: NH3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW - "3 LOOP 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM 
3) "3 BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER 
4) "3 LOOP 
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9)  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 1/ 1 
TAL: 1/ 1 
AOA: 1/ 1 
AT0 : 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 1/ 1 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 C [  1 
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES : 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
A RESTRICTION WITHIN THE "3 PORTION OF THE BOILER/HEAT EXCHANGER 
WILL RESULT IN INADEQUATE COOLING OF ORBITER SYSTEMS. LOSS OF 
COOLING WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING THOSE PHASES 
THAT THE "3 BOILER IS REQUIRED. 
REFERENCES: SSSH 7.1 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-41 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/04/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14032 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
2/ 1R 
ABORT: 2/1R 
FLIGHT: 
ITEM: TANK ISOLATION VALVE (NC) 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN - ELECTRICALLY 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
WDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1 ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
1 AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM 
I CONTROLLERS (A & B) 
I TANK ISOLATION VALVE (NC) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 2/1R 
TAL: 2/1R 
AOA: 2/1R 
AT0 : 3/1R 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 2/ 1R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [NA 1 c r p 1  
LOCATION : AFT BODY - AREA 50 
PART NUMBER: 50V63Al-LV1, LV2 
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF INPUT TO THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS 
OF ONE AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM. LOSS OF BOTH AMMONIA BOILER 
SYSTEMS CAN RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING LAUNCH 
ABORTS, ETC. 
REFERENCES: SSSH 7.1 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-42 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
E 
1 
E 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/05/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14033 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
1/ 1 
ABORT: 1/ 1 
FLIGHT: 
ITEM: "3 TANK ISOLATION VALVE 
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM 
3) TANK ISOLATION VALVE 
4) 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
AT0 : 
LIFTOFF : 1/ 1 
ONORBIT: 1/ 1 
DEORBIT : 1/ 1 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 
LOCATION : AFT BODY - AREA 50 
PART NUMBER: 50V63Al-LV1, LV2 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LEAKAGE OF AMMONIA INTO THE BOILER COULD RESULT IN EXCESSIVE 
COOLING OF THE FREON LOOPS, LOWERING THEIR TEMPERATURE WHICH IN 
TURN LOWERS THE TEMPERATURE OF THE INTERCHANGER, POSSIBLY 
RUPTURING THE WATER LOOPS AND ELIMINATING ALL VEHICLE COOLING. 
REFERENCES: SSSH 7.2 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-43 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/05/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14034 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT : 3/3 
ABORT : P A  
ITEM: "3 FILL AND DRAIN QUICK DISCONNECTS 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
mKD0WN HIERARCHY: 
ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM 
1 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM 
I QUICK DISCONNECTS 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : /NA 
TAL: /NA 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
AOA: /NA 
LIFTOFF : /NA 
ONORBIT: /" 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 C [  1 
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: ME276-0030-0011 
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILURE TO CLOSE THE FILL AND DRAIN QUICK DISCONNECTS OCCURS 
DURING GROUND OPERATIONS ONLY. IT HAS NO AFFECT DURING FLIGHT. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-44 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 05/88 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14035 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/F"C 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: "3 FILL AND DRAIN QUICK DISCONNECTS 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM 
3) FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM 
4) QUICK DISCONNECTS 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA 
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA 
ONORBIT : /NA AOA: /NA 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C  1 C [  1 
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: ME276-0030-0011 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
OPENING OF THE QUICK DISCONNECT OCCURS ONLY DURING GROUND 
OPERATIONS. THE FAILURE TO OPEN WILL HAVE NO AFFECT DURING 
FLIGHT. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-45 
INDEPENDENT-ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 05/8 8 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14036 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: "3 FILL AND DRAIN QUICK DISCONNECTS 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM 
3) FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM 
4) QUICK DISCONNECTS 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F"C 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/ 1R 
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R 
DEORBIT : 3/ 1R AT0 : 3/ 1R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 3/.m 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F l  C [ P l  
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: ME276-0030-0011 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE WITHIN A QUICK DISCONNECT IS CAUSED BY LOSS OF 
ONE SEAL WITHIN THE QD. THIS FIRST LOSS HAS NO AFFECT AND IS NOT 
DETECTABLE (FAILS SCREEN B). LOSS OF SECOND SEAL WILL RESULT IN 
LOSS OF ONE ABS. LOSS OF SECOND ABS CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF 
VEHICLE COOLING AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-46 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/05/00 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
MDAC ID: 14037 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 1/ 1 
ABORT : 1/ 1 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS - AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM 
3) LINES AND FITTINGS 
4) BOILER MANIFOLD INLET AND OVERLOAD VENT 
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 1/ 1 
LIFTOFF : /NA TAL: 1/ 1 
ONORBIT : /NA AOA: 1/ 1 
DEORBIT : 1/ 1 AT0 : 1/1 ’ 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 C [  1 
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
RESTRICTED FLOW IN THIS AREA WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF THE ABS. 
LOSS OF THE ABS DURING CRITICAL PHASES CAN MEAN LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-47 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/15/88 
MDAC ID: 14038 
SUBSYSTEM: ATCS 
ITEM: AMMONIA SUPPLY TANK 
FAILURE MODE: BURSTS 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: I/ 1 
ABORT : 1/ 1 I 
LEAD ANALYST: S . K .  SINCLAIR SUBSYS LEAD: W.E. PARKMAN 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM 
2) AMMONIA BOILER SYSTEM 
3) TANK 
4 )  
5) 
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
AT0 : 
PRELAUNCH: /NA 
LIFTOFF: 1/ 1 
ONORBIT : 1/ 1 
DEORBIT : 1/ 1 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B C  1 
LOCATION: AFT BODY - AREA 50 
PART NUMBER: 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, OVERPRESSURIZATION, CORROSION I 
I EFFECTS/RATIONALE: AMMONIA TANK EXPLODES ELIMINATING ABS COOLING SYSTEM AND POSSIBLY DAMAGING SURROUNDING ORBITER HARDWARE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/10/88 E-48 
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APPENDIX F 
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET 
CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS 
F-1 
APPENDIX F 
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and 
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E. 
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment 
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA 
recommendations. 
Appendix F Legend 
Code Definition 
This FMEA reflects loss of sensor data only. 
Criticality should be 3/3 .  
Raise criticality from NASA's recommended value to 
indicated value. 
Insufficient data is available to resolve the 
issue at this time. 
Lower-criticality from NASAs recommended value to 
indicated level. 
No equivalent NASA FMEA to this IOA FMEA. 
mode should be re-examined by NASA and added to 
the data base. 
Failure 
This FMEA reflects a loss of topping evaporator 
only. 
in a loss of mission, but with no impact on crew 
or vehicle safety. Criticalities should be re- 
examined with this criteria in mind and adjusted 
accordingly. 
Loss of the topping evaporator will result 
This FMEA affects the nozzle heaters. Loss of the 
heater can result in a nozzle freeze up and 
possible loss of the associated evaporator. 
Criticalities should be adjusted to account for 
this possible consequence. 
Upon re-examination, IOA has determined this to be 
a non-credible failure mode. IOA recommends that 
this failure be deleted. 
The different criticality is being' recommended to 
maintain consistency throughout the FMEA package. 
F-2 
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(10) This failure affects ground operations only. In 
accordance with NSTS 22206, IOA recommends 
assigning this FMEA a 3/3 criticality. 
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